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ARTICLES
THE TRAVEL BAN DECISION, ADMINISTRATIVE




The Supreme Court's deferential decision upholding President Trump's
travel ban muted longtime values ofjudicial craft. Consider the interaction of
constitutional and statutory interpretation. In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor
likened the Court's decision in Trump v. Hawaii to Korematsu v. United
States, in which the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a convic-
tion arising from the Japanese-American internment. Writing for the Hawaii
majority, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the comparison. Lost in the clamor-
ous debate about Korematsu's substantive relevance was an important meth-
odological point: The Hawaii Court could have taken a page from another
decision on the internment, Ex Parte Endo, which held that a key component
of the internment exceeded the scope of Congress's delegation to the
Executive. Instead, the Hawaii Court coupled a mechanical defense of the
travel ban on statutory grounds with an unconvincing analysis of the plain-
tiffs' Establishment Clause claim.
The prime flaw in the Court's Establishment Clause analysis was its puzzling
reliance on rational basis review decisions, such as City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Independent Living Center, that subjected government action to far
more searching means-ends scrutiny than the Hawaii majority was willing to
employ. The robust inquiry in those cases contrasted with the Hawaii majority's
blinkered deference. An approach more attuned to judicial craft would have rec-
ognized this problem and pivoted toward a statutory holding against he travel
ban. Practicing foreign affairs deference, the Hawaii majority instead read an
* Professor Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A., Colgate; J.D., Columbia Law
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immigration law provision in isolation from its statutory context. That move
failed to acknowledge earlier cases such as Kent v. Dulles, which tempered
Executive overreach during the Cold War, and more recent administrative law
decisions such as King v. Burwell, which examined the overall scheme of the
Affordable Care Act to interpret a provision governing health care exchanges.
This article critiques Hawaii's flawed Establishment Clause and statutory
analyses, applying the wisdom of Ex Parte Endo, the Cold War cases, and the
recent administrative law decisions. That approach also highlights the risks
of the Hawaii Court's undue deference. In method, Hawaii's deference
resembles the Korematsu holding that Justice Robert Jackson's dissent
warned was a "loaded weapon" aiding further executive branch abuses. This
article offers a toolkit for defusing that dangerous weapon and making sense
of legislative delegation on immigration issues.
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INTRODUCTION
As the Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. Hawaii1 showed, dire predic-
tions often drive judicial deference. According to Chief Justice Roberts, who
wrote the majority opinion,2 the statutory arguments advanced by the chal-
lengers of President Trump's travel ban3 (EO-3)4 would have "cramped" the
exercise of power that Congress delegated to the President in the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (INA).' Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts asserted
that accepting the challengers' Establishment Clause arguments regarding
President Trump's statements could affect the "authority of the Presidency
itself."6 The majority opinion warned against what this Article refers to as
"structural spillover," or the danger that a judicial decision against the
Executive or Congress could impair the effective performance of the political
branches in the roles that the Framers envisioned. However, the Hawaii ma-
jority failed to recognize that structural spillover has a flip side: undue defer-
ence, which can obscure the courts' distinctive virtues of "judgment,"
1. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
2. Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch joined this opinion; Justice Kennedy also wrote a
brief concurrence, while Justice Thomas concurred to address the issue of nationwide injunctions. Justice
Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined. Justice Breyer wrote another
dissent, in which Justice Kagan joined.
3. See Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
4. For ease of reference, this Article distinguishes September 2017 proclamation from the two earlier
executive orders (EOs) on the subject issued by President Trump, using the abbreviation EO-3.
5. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2412.
6. Id. at 2418.
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"moderation," and independence.7
To manage both sides to such spillover, the Court should have relied on
statutory interpretation, holding that EO-3 exceeded the power that Congress
delegated to the President.8 For earlier proponents of judicial restraint such as
Justice Felix Frankfurter, statutory interpretation was a vital resource in curb-
ing executive abuses without the structural spillover caused by a constitutional
holding.9 Holding that an executive action exceeds the scope of statutory dele-
gation avoids serious constitutional questions10 and gives the political branches
space to tailor their approaches without the rigidity of a constitutional rule.
Even when a given reading of a statute will not trigger constitutional issues,
courts will decline to read a single statutory provision "in isolation," and will
instead construe a statute as a "harmonious whole" to respect Congress's "over-
all scheme."11 In either instance, courts will consult past practice of the political
branches to confirm the plausibility of particular reading.12
In Hawaii, a statutory holding would have cured several methodological
problems in the majority opinion. It would have sidestepped the gaps in the
Court's constitutional holding that EO-3 satisfied the highly deferential
"facially legitimate and bona fide" standard,13 as well as its alternative hold-
ing that EO-3 passed muster under ational basis review. The Court's prece-
dents on the "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard lacked demonstrable
indicia of bad faith such as candidate Donald Trump's anti-Muslim state-
ments. Moreover, the majority's view that EO-3 also survived rational basis
review14 did not apply the robust means-end scrutiny of equal protection
cases cited by the Court, such as City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Independent
Living Center."5 A statutory holding against EO-3 would also have harmon-
ized more effectively with the INA's antidiscrimination provision16 and
7. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467-70 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
8. Both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits had relied in part on statutory arguments in affirming injunc-
tions against EO-3. See Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 684 (9th Cir. 2017); International Refugee
Assistance Project (IRAP) v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 289-305 (4th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Gregory, J., con-
curring); id. at 311-19 (Keenan, J., concurring).
9. United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201 (1957); Philip P. Frickey, Getting From Joe to
Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation
in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. REv. 397 (2005).
10. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60-61 (1932); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
11. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000).
12. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 121-24 (1958).
13. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018).
14. Id. at 2420 (assuming that rational basis review is appropriate and finding that EO-3 passed
muster under this standard). This Article concedes that the Court was correct that the "reasonable ob-
server" standard often used in Establishment Clause cases was too intrusive for the complex foreign
relations and national security issues at stake in the travel ban case. See id. at 2418-19 (arguing forjudi-
cial caution in foreign relations matters characterized by "changing political and economic circumstan-
ces"); see also infra notes 88-121 and accompanying text (noting problems with Establishment Clause
case against EO-3).
15. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (cited in Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at
2420).
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (barring discrimination in decisions on immigrant visas).
[Vol. 33:159
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elaborate statutory scheme governing visa processing.17 The Hawaii majority
instead opted for a mechanical deference that earlier advocates of judicial
restraint such as Justice Frankfurter had rejected as insufficiently nuanced.
This article seeks to reclaim the promise of those earlier precedents.
The article is in five Parts. Part I briefly provides the factual background
for EO-3 and summarizes the opinions in Trump v. Hawaii. Part II introduces
the problem of structural spillover, recognizing that spillover can affect both
the political branches' freedom of action and the courts' reputation. Part III
examines the constitutional issues raised by EO-3, concluding that difficult
challenges plagued both the majority opinion's efforts to justify EO-3 and the
dissent's argument that EO-3 was constitutionally infirm. Part IV discusses
two statutory responses to executive overreach that he Court has employed
when it wishes to defuse the risks of a constitutional ruling: 1) constitutional
avoidance, and 2) reading a statute in context. Part V critiques the Hawaii
majority's departure from these responses to instead read one provision of
the INA in isolation, divorced from the legislature's intention to combat
discrimination.
I. EO-3: ORIGINS, OPERATION, AND RECEPTION IN THE COURTS
President Trump issued EO-3 in September 2017, as the third executive
measure taken that year on entry of foreign nationals into the United States.
Prior to issuance of EO-3, President Trump issued an EO in January 2017
(EO-I) and a revised EO (EO-2) in March 2017. This Part reviews the con-
tent of each EO, as well as the relevant provisions of the INA.18 It also briefly
summarizes the opinions in Trump v. Hawaii, in which the Supreme Court
upheld EO-3 against challenges based on the statute and the Establishment
Clause.
A. The INA and EO-3
The INA enumerates forms of legal status for both immigrants-those
who intend to stay permanently in the United States-and nonimmigrants.19
17. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2443-44 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
18. See Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty: Judicial Review of Immigration Law in the
Trump Administration, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1,49-51.
19. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 13 (1982) (noting that the INA is a "comprehensive and complete
code covering all aspects of admission of aliens to this country" (citing Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647,
664 (1978))). The Supreme Court has long held that Congress has plenary power over immigration, de-
spite the absence of clear references to immigration in the Constitution. Compare David A. Martin, Why
Immigration's Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REv. 29, 44 (2015) (discussing the most
plausible arguments for judicial deference), with Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court,
2009-13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism?, 68 OKLA. L. REv. 57, 61-62 (2015) (argu-
ing that recent Supreme Court decisions relying on constitutional values in interpreting immigration stat-
utes heralded eventual demise of deference); see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American
Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1842-78 (1993) (noting role of states and less
pronounced federal regulation of immigration during first century of United States' existence); cf.
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup.
CT. REV. 255, 262 (in critiquing judicial deference to Congress, observing that "it ignores reality to hold
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Immigrants to the United States fall into categories such as "immediate rela-
tives" of U.S. citizens, including spouses, children, and parents," as well as
spouses and children of lawful permanent residents (LPRs).21 The immigrant
category also includes foreign nationals who have received "employment-
based visas" because they have special talents or will fill a skilled vocational
slot for which citizens or LPRs are unavailable.22 Nonimmigrants, who by
definition intend only to stay in the United States temporarily and for a spe-
cific purpose, include students, business travelers, temporary workers in agri-
culture and other fields, and tourists.2 Congress has established detailed
criteria for visa eligibility,24 along with additional criteria for admissibility to
the United States, including bars on admission for otherwise-eligible foreign
nationals who have committed crimes, engaged in terrorism, suffer from seri-
ous communicable diseases, or pose a risk of dependence on the government
for their financial support.2 Under the INA, State Department consular offi-
cials abroad typically make decisions about visa applicants' eligibility and
admissibility.26
Two particular provisions of the INA are crucial to the statutory backdrop
of EO-3.27 The first, added in 1952 at the height of the Cold War, is 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(f) (the "entry provision"), and authorizes the President to "suspend
the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens" when that entry is "detrimental
to the interests of the United States." The second, added in 1965 as part of a
massive liberalization of the INA, 28 is 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (the "nondis-
crimination provision"), in which Congress provided that no individual shall
that every provision concerned with immigration, as applied to every fact situation it might encompass, is
so intimately rooted in foreign policy that the usual scope of judicial review would hamper the effective
conduct of foreign relations"); Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards' Fathers and Good Victims:
Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 557
(2000) (critiquing foundations of plenary power doctrine and application to gender roles); Matthew J.
Lindsay, Disaggregating "Immigration Law", 68 FLA. L. REV. 179 (2017) (analyzing distinctive compo-
nents of immigration that may require varying levels of deference); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of
Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002) (contending that plenary power is fading phenomenon).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2018).
21. Id.§ 1153(a).
22. Id. § 1153(b). In the employment-based visa category, issues can arise about whether an
employer has defined a job in a fashion that unduly excludes citizens or LPRs. Compare Fogo de Chao
(Holdings) Inc. v. DHS, 769 F.3d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (in case involving employment of chefs at
Brazilian steakhouses, declining to extend deference to agency ruling that "specialized knowledge"
required of employment-based visa applicant for "specialty occupation" under 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1)
could not include cultural knowledge only available to persons who had grown up in particular Brazilian
culture and tradition); id. at 1152 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that agency ruling was entitled to
deference and consistent with statutory presumption against restrictions that would limit employment
opportunities for citizens and LPRs).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (listing categories ofnonimmigrants).
24. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2442-44 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (listing criminal grounds for inadmissibility); id., § 1182(a)(3)
(listing security and related grounds).
26. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2442-44 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
27. Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty, supra note 18, at 51-54.
28. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REv. 273, 279 83 (1996).
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"be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the
person's race, sex, nationality, place of birth or place of residence."
In late January, 2017, President Trump relied on the entry provision in
issuing EO-1, which temporarily halted entry of foreign nationals from seven
countries-Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen-and all
persons granted refugee status abroad.2 9 The EO suspended entry for the
seven-country nationals for 90 days, and entry of refugees for 120 days.30
EO-i included current nonimmigrant visa-holders (VHs), such as doctors
working on a temporary basis in U.S. hospitals or university students returning
from travel abroad during the holiday recess. The order also did not expressly
exclude returning LPRs from its restrictions.3 1 At airports around the country,
chaos reigned as immigration officials detained and in some cases summarily
removed VHs despite lawful commitments in the United States, such as con-
tinuation with university education or a posting at a U.S. hospital.32
In March, 2017, after EO-I encountered a rocky reception in the lower fed-
eral courts, President Trump revoked this measure and replaced it with
Executive Order No. 13780 (EO-2).33 EO-2 stated that he pause in admis-
sions was designed to "improve ... screening and vetting protocols and pro-
tocols" for visa and refugee processing,34 and to ensure that inadequately
screened or vetted persons did not enter the U.S. as that review took place.
This revised EO expressly exempted LPRs and current VHs, removed Iraq
from the list of countries whose nationals were affected, and instituted a
waiver program based on the "national interest," compliance with interna-
tional agreements or understandings, undue hardship, and other factors.35
After the Fourth and Ninth Circuits upheld injunctions against EO-2, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.36 However, EO-2 expired before the Court
could rule on the merits.37
President Trump issued EO-3 in September 2017. EO-3 is indefinite in du-
ration, although it is subject to review every 180 days. Initially, EO-3 sus-
pended entry of both immigrants and some or all classes of nonimmigrants
from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Yemen.38  The
29. Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017) [hereinafter IRAP]
(chronicling facts in the course of granting a stay that modified injunction against EO-2, which President
Trump had issued after EO-1).
30. Id.
31. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1165 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that EO did not
expressly exempt LPRs and that subsequent statements by White House Counsel disclaiming intent to
include LPRs did not bind the Executive).
32. Id. at 1157.
33. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (2017) [hereinafter EO-3]; see also Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392,2403-04 (2018) (discussing chronology).
34. SeeEO-3, § l(a).
35. See id. § 6(c) (waiver provisions); id. § 6(b) (lowering refugee cap).
36. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).
37. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2404 (2018). The Court also vacated the lower court decisions
as moot. Id.
38. Id. at 2406.
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administration had dropped Sudan from the list. In addition, EO-3 bars the
entry of immigrants from Somalia, subjects Iraqi nationals to heightened
screening, and bars nonimmigrant entry of certain Venezuelan government
officials and their families. Ultimately, the administration found that Chad
had complied with various U.S. government requests, and officials removed
it from the EO-3 list. EO-3 also includes a waiver process, which requires a
foreign national otherwise covered by the EO to show that the bar to entry
would result in undue hardship, that she does not present a threat, and that her
entry would be in the national interest.3 9 EO-3 does permit the admission of
refugees and most students.40
B. The Supreme Court Weighs In
In June, 2018, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that EO-3's
challengers were not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief, since they
had not shown a likelihood of success on their claims under either the
INA41 and the Establishment Clause.42 With respect to the statutory claim,
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion for the Court cited the "plain language" of
the INA's "entry" provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f),43 and the deference "tradi-
tionally accorded" the President in national security and foreign rela-
tions.4 4 Deference also carried the day with respect to the Establishment
Clause. Citing the need for deference, the majority declined to apply the
"reasonable observer" test that it has often used in Establishment Clause
cases involving school prayer, religious symbols, and aid to religious
groups. 4 Applying a test that had figured in previous immigration cases on
criteria for the entry of foreign nationals, the Court held that EO-3 was
"facially legitimate and bona fide." 46 In addition, in an alternative holding,
the Court found that EO-3 survived rational basis review.47 The Court sug-
gested limits to deference by purporting to overrule Korematsu v. United
States, in which the Court had upheld a conviction arising out of the
shameful Japanese-American internment of World War II. In a concur-
rence that turned out to be valedictory in fact as well as flavor, Justice
Kennedy observed that, ultimately, compliance with the Constitution was
the responsibility of both public officials and the people themselves.49
39. EO-3, § 3(c).
40. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2405-06.
41. Id. at 2415.
42. Id. at 2423.
43. Id. at 2408 (asserting that language accorded the President "broad discretion to suspend the entry
of aliens into the United States").
44. Id. at 2409.
45. Id. at 2420 n. 5.
46. Id. at 2418-20.
47. Id. at 2420-21.
48. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
49. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424.
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The majority's effort to overrule Korematsu was a response to the critique
of deference in Justice Sotomayor's dissent, in which Justice Ginsburg
joined. Justice Sotomayor linked the majority's deferential stance with the in-
famous Korematsu ruling, predicting that the Hawaii decision would simi-
larly "endure" as a stain on the Court's reputation.0 In seeking a more robust
limit on the Court's deference, Justice Sotomayor was curiously reticent on
the statutory question. Justice Sotomayor noted that EO-3's broad restrictions
appeared inconsistent with e "painstaking detail" and "reticulated scheme
[in the INA] regulating the admission of individuals to the United States.''5
However, Justice Sotomayor declined to address what she termed the chal-
52lengers' "complex" statutory arguments, even though she acknowledged
the Court's "prudential rule" of avoiding constitutional decisions when statu-
tory grounds will suffice.3 Instead of addressing the statutory arguments,
Justice Sotomayor focused on the Establishment Clause challenge to EO-3,
asserting that he Court should have applied the "reasonable observer" test
that it has often invoked in such cases. Citing then candidate Donald Trump's
well-known call for a "total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the
United States,5 4 Justice Sotomayor asserted that EO-3 failed the "reasonable
observer" standard as well as rational basis review.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, also dissented. Justice Breyer's dis-
sent was in some ways a counterpoint to Justice Sotomayor's dissenting opin-
ion. While Justice Sotomayor declined to address the challengers' "complex"
statutory argument, Justice Breyer provided a detailed explanation of why the
parsimonious implementation of EO-3's waiver provisions56 counseled leaving
lower court injunctions against the measure in effect and remanding for further
factfinding on the statutory and constitutional merits.5 7 However, apart from the
fact-specific questions that he raised about EO-3's waiver process, Justice
Breyer also did not develop the argument that EO-3 violated the INA. 8
II. STRUCTURAL SPILLOVER AS A DIFFERENCE-MAKER IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The Hawaii majority's reasoning is a prime example of concern about
structural spillover. Court decisions do more than merely decide individual
50. Id. at 2448.
51. Id.at2443.
52. Id. at 2434.
53. Id. at 2433-34 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993)).
54. Id. at 2435.
55. Id. at 2441-42.
56. Id. at 2431-33.
57. Id. at 2433. Since the Court only decided that a preliminary injunction was not appropriate, the
district court will have an opportunity to consider in further proceedings whether problems with the
waiver process or other aspects of EO-3's implementation call for a permanent injunction. Id. at 2433.
58. Id. at 2433. Instead, Justice Breyer stated that if he had to decide the merits at this point, he would
cite Donald Trump's statements as candidate and President as evidence of impermissible "antireligious
bias." Id.
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cases. They also send signals to policymakers about the parameters of discre-
tion. Each case sends such signals, and courts worry that their lack of political
accountability and limited access to information do not equip them to
adequately weigh the signals' impact.5 9 That concern is particularly pro-
nounced in constitutional cases, where a decision may hinder the political
branches' future collaboration and leave the public with no remedy short of
the cumbersome process of constitutional amendment. Unfortunately, this
concern fails to acknowledge that deference also has spillover effects, injur-
ing the courts' reputation for independence and blinking at policymakers'
surrender to the passions of the moment.60
Deferential jurists believe that both the outcome of a decision and the
methodology the Court applies can have adverse impacts on the political
branches' ability to function within the Constitution's structure.61 In Hawaii,
Chief Justice Roberts asserted that the Establishment Clause argument by
EO-3's challengers had implications not merely for the current occupant of
the White House, but for the "Presidency" itself.62 Chief Justice Roberts
warned that the challengers' argument would entail the "delicate" parsing of
statements by presidents and political candidates.63 The dictionary defines
the word, "delicate," as "needing careful treatment ... because easily dam-
aged ... [or] to avoid causing trouble...,,64 A "delicate" task is difficult, but
not impossible. By using the adjective "delicate" to describe this interpretive
task, Chief Justice Roberts appeared to suggest that a decision that appeared
straightforward, as the Hawaii dissenters viewed analysis of Donald Trump's
statements,6 could nonetheless prompt future interpretive mishaps and
mixed signals for policymakers. For the majority, those concerns about the
59. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010) (noting that "national security
and foreign policy concerns arise in connection with efforts to confront evolving threats in an area where
information can be difficult to obtain the impact of certain conduct difficult to assess"); see also Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. at 2419 (warning that "when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in
this area, 'the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked"') (citing Holder, 561 U.S. 1
(2010)).
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (praising
potential of judicial review for curbing "ill humors" that cloud deliberation by the political branches).
61. Scholars have viewed matters of judicial methodology, including efforts to craft manageable
standards, as "trans-substantive" concerns that affect a range of legal doctrines, including those relevant
to both statutory and constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE
CONSTITUTION 38 (2001) (discussing concerns about implementation of constitutional norms and values
that help shape formulation of legal standards); William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of
Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REv. 1079, 1107-12 (2017) (discussing nature and operation of interpretive
rules); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure. The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978) (discussing how court's choice of legal standard contributes to under- or
over-enforcement of norms); Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REv. 1, 30-
50 (2004) (analyzing prophylactic rules uch as Miranda that prevent violations of constitutional rights);
Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REv. 1361 (2009); Kermit Roosevelt
III, Constitutional Calcification. How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649
(2005).
62. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2418.
63. Id.
64. Delicate, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambidge.org/us/dictionary/english/delicate
(last visited August 2, 2018).
65. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct at 2435-36 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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future, as well as concerns about he current case, prompted the need for a
greater quantum of deference than the dissenters were prepared to provide.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence reinforced the methodological concern at
the core of the Court's choices about structural spillover. Invoking a factor
that drove his opinion for the Court in Ziglar v. Abbasi66 on suits for damages
in national security cases,67 Justice Kennedy suggested the process of adjudi-
cation itself could "intrude" on the executive branch's foreign affairs prerog-
atives.68 In addition, Justice Kennedy appeared to concede that the
methodological challenges that drive judicial deference sometimes lead to
underenforcement of constitutional norms.69 Judicial concern with structural
spillover might leave even illegal official action free from "judicial scrutiny or
intervention."7 That concession flowed from Justice Kennedy's plaintive
note that officials are not "free to disregard the Constitution and the rights
it proclaims and protects" and are bound by their "oath" to preserve the
Constitution even when the courts cannot "correct or even comment" on official
actions.71 Justice Kennedy's language acknowledged that in some proportion of
cases, officials will not make the right choice, but courts' concerns about struc-
tural spillover will preclude a remedy. In that abject cohort of cases, Justice
Kennedy, like Justice Frankfurter in an earlier decision, Dennis v. United
States,72 identified the diligence and good faith of the political branches and the
people as the only effective protection for constitutional norms.
However, a method of judicial review that predictably yields underen-
forced norms can engender spillover effects of its own. Consider deferential
jurists' solicitude for collaboration between the political branches. That value
figured prominently in the Japanese-American internment precedents that the
Court sought to at least partially disavow in Hawaii. In Hirabayashi v.
United States,73 the Court upheld a conviction of a defendant who had failed
to comply with the terms of a military order issued during the early stages of
the Japanese-American internment. The Court justified this outcome by
observing that Congress and the President were "acting together ... in coop-
eration. '74 Justice Sotomayor's dissent in Hawaii rightly pointed out the
66. Ziglarv. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
67. See Peter Margulies, Curbing Remedies for Official Wrongs: The Need for Bivens Suits in
National Security Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1153, (2018); compare Andrew Kent, Are Damages
Different?: Bivens and National Security, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1123 (2014) (praising the Court's wariness
about suits for damages), with Carlos M. Vazquez & Steven I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and
the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (2013) (critiquing limits on suits for damages
against errant officials); see generally Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 SuP. CT. REV. 281 (contending that suits for damages
can prompt excessive risk-aversion by public officials).
68. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424; see also Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860.
69. See Sager, supra note 61.
70. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424.
71. Id.
72. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 546-55 (1950).
73. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
74. Id. at 91-92.
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incongruity in the majority's simultaneous deference toward EO-3 and retreat
from deference in its overruling of Hirabayashi's companion in the anti-
canon, Korematsu v. United States.75 Justice Jackson's dissent in Korematsu
famously called the majority's deferential turn in that case a "loaded
weapon" that would impel future political branch excesses and decimate the
courts' reputation for independent judgment.76 In Trump v. Hawaii, Justice
Sotomayor alluded to Justice Jackson's warning.77 Seeking to disarm the
"loaded weapon" of its earlier holding in Korematsu, the Hawaii majority
announced what everyone already knew: that Jackson had been correct in
critiquing Korematsu as "gravely wrong" when it was decided and ever
since.78 Nevertheless, as Justice Sotomayor observed, the Hawaii majority's
holding stuck with the deferential stance that Jackson had deplored.
As a matter of legal doctrine, Chief Justice Roberts may have been right in
sharply distinguishing Korematsu from Hawaii.79 Korematsu's upholding of
a key building block in the internment of U.S. citizens and LPRs was a mate-
rially more serious blow to constitutionalism than EO-3's restrictions on for-
eign nationals located abroad, who are not subject to U.S. laws and therefore
have no reciprocal claim to U.S. legal protections.80 However, that point does
not address the impact of the methodological shortcomings in the Hawaii
majority's constitutional analysis, which we take up in the next section.
III. JUDICIAL METHOD ECLIPSED: THE TRAVEL BAN AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
The Establishment Clause analyses of both the Hawaii majority and
Justice Sotomayor's dissent each suffer from substantial methodological
flaws. Justice Sotomayor' s dissent relied on a rigid application of the "reason-
able observer" test81 that the Court has often construed loosely when dual
purposes are in play, even in the relatively contained context of public reli-
gious displays.82 The dissent failed to acknowledge the challenges inherent in
constructing a unitary "reasonable observer" amidst the "changing world
75. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2447-48 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944)).
76. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245-46.
77. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2448.
78. Id.at2423.
79. Id. at 2443 (contrasting "forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and
explicitly on the basis of race ... [with] facially neutral order denying certain foreign nationals the privi-
lege of admission").
80. Setting the precise contours of the Constitution abroad is a sensitive task beyond the scope of this
Article. Compare GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) (arguing for expansive vision of constitutional rights), with Andrew Kent,
Disappearing Legal Black Holes and Converging Domains: Changing Individual Rights Protection in
National Security and Foreign Affairs, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 1029, 1038-41 (2015) (arguing that histori-
cally sources of legal authority provided only modest protection to foreign nationals outside a state or to
foreign nationals participating in an armed conflict inside a state).
81. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772-73 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
82. Id. at 763-68 (plurality opinion); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,692 (2005)
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conditions"83 that the political branches regularly encounter in national secu-
rity and foreign affairs. Moreover, Justice Sotomayor's dissent sought to
show the impermissible animus behind EO-3 by parsing Donald Trump's
statements as a candidate and then as President.84 Supreme Court precedent
and Justice Sotomayor's own dissent revealed that parsing the statements of
any president-even one as given as President Trump to outrageous public
utterances-can be complex. However, the majority's efforts to select and
apply a workable standard of review also foundered, since the precedents the
majority cited86 require a more searching inquiry than the majority deigned
to provide. 
8 7
A. The Reasonable Observer Test's Poor Fit with Foreign Affairs
The Hawaii majority was correct in noting that the "reasonable observer"
standard that the Court has intermittently used in matters governing public re-
ligious displays88 does not provide the political branches with the
"flexibility... to respond to changing world conditions."89 This lack of fit is
in part a symptom of a more general problem that Establishment Clause
precedents have often lacked a "clear test of religious validity." 9 The exis-
tence of dual purposes for government measures has complicated the Court's
application of specific tests even in the ordinary domestic context of alleged
symbolic support for eligion.91 The dynamic foreign affairs area compounds
the problem of multiple motives and audiences, making construction of a uni-
tary "reasonable observer" even more challenging.
As Robert Putnam observed in a classic piece,92 foreign relations is a game
played on multiple levels. Policymakers must placate international partners,
83. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419-20 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976)).
84. Id. at 2437-38.
85. See infra notes 88-121 and accompanying text. Professor Shalini Ray has articulated a useful bur-
den-shifting test that eases this problem, although it does not wholly eliminate it. See Shalini Ray,
Plenary Power and Animus in Immigration Law, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.
ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3131044.
86. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420 (citing, inter alia, City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432 (1985)).
87. The issue of the Establishment Clause's original rationale is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf.
Richard Fallon, Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 70 n. 47 (2017) (canvassing
theories and expressing doubt that "modem Establishment Clause questions hould be resolved in exclu-
sive reliance on any reasonably disputable claim about original constitutional meaning"); compare Noah
Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 351-52 (2002)
(arguing that freedom of conscience was the original driving force behind the Establishment Clause);
with Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REv. 317, 322-37 (2011) (critiqu-
ing "freedom of conscience" explanation on descriptive and normative grounds).
88. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2418.
89. Id. at 2419-20 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976)).
90. Fallon, supra note 87, at 686; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality
opinion) (asserting that various tests the Court has suggested are "'no more than helpful signposts') (cita-
tion omitted); id. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that "no single mechanical formula ... can
accurately draw the constitutional line in every case").
91. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring).
92. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. The Logic of Two -Level Games, 42 INT'L
ORG. 427 (1988).
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parry the moves of international adversaries, and accommodate domestic
constituencies. Mixed motives and shifting agendas are perennial compo-
nents of governance in this sphere. No roadmap, recipe, or multi-factor test
can do justice to this complex undertaking.93
Mixed motives are a mainstay even in the domestic domain. Consider, for
example, the imposition of a tax. As the Court recognized in NFIB v.
Sebelius,94 in upholding the Affordable Care Act as an exercise of the taxing
power, Congress may impose a tax to raise revenue.9 However, legislators
enacting a tax will also often intend to "affect conduct."9 6 For example, the
ACA's individual mandate encouraged individuals to procure health insur-
ance. Similarly, taxes on cigarettes discourage smoking. However, Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for the Court in NFIB, noted that the presence of a
motive besides raising revenue did not in and of itself disqualify the measure
as a valid exercise of the taxing power.
Mixed motives are just as ubiquitous in foreign affairs, where application
of a rigid constitutional test could undermine productive collaboration
between the political branches. Consider congressional efforts to assist cer-
tain religious groups suffering persecution abroad, such as the Lautenberg
Amendment, which singles out certain specific religious groups for favorable
legal treatment of asylum claims.97 Under accepted Establishment Clause
principles, assistance to a specific religious group is just as suspect as
measures that appear to harm specific groups. Both potentially "entangle"
the government in religion in a way that the Establishment Clause pre-
cludes.98 Legislators may well have had a range of motives for this mea-
sure: some may have wished to aid particular groups out of solidarity with
their religious beliefs; others may have simply wished to respond to epi-
sodes of persecution that seemed particularly compelling. Regardless, the
Lautenberg Amendment treated some religious groups better than others.
Its statutory presumption spared the legislatively favored groups from the
rigorous adjudication process for asylum claims based on religious
93. See also James D. Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and Escalation of International Disputes,
88 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 577 (1994) (discussing interplay between domestic political imperatives and course
of international diplomacy); cf. Matthew C. Waxman, The Power to Threaten War, 123 YALE L.J. 1626,
1634 (2014) (suggesting in analyzing domestic war powers that "the actual and effective balance between
presidential and congressional powers over war and peace in practice necessarily depends on shifting
assumptions and policy choices about how best to secure U.S. interests against potential threats").
94. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
95. Id. at 564-67.
96. Id. at 567.
97. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (b)(2)(A) (1989) note and subsequent amendments, providing that, "[a]liens
who are (or were) nationals and residents of an independent state of the former Soviet Union or of
Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania and who are Jews or Evangelical Christians shall be deemed" to be presump-
tive refugees); see also Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty, supra note 18, at 69 (discussing
Lautenberg Amendment in context of EO-3); cf. Michael J. Churgin, Is Religion Different: Is There a
Thumb on the Scale in Refugee Convention Appellate Court Jurisdiction in the United States? Some
Preliminary Thoughts, 51 TEx. INT'L L.J. 213, 215 (2016) (asserting that legislation inappropriately dis-
tinguishes between religious groups).
98. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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persecution. Other groups were not so fortunate. They had to go through
the interviews and hearings that the asylum process requires, with no assur-
ance that they would prevail on the merits.
In situations not involving foreign affairs, such favorable legislative treat-
ment would have constituted a colorable violation of the Establishment
Clause. However, the Lautenberg Amendment, which Congress eventually
expanded to include other groups such as religious minorities from Iran,99
allowed Congress to proactively address the acute persecution suffered by
such groups.100 Without the discretion to select certain groups, at least as an
initial matter, the legislation may well have failed to pass. As the Hawaii ma-
jority suggested about the structural spillover engendered by the challengers'
theory of the Establishment Clause,0 a rigid standard would have stymied
the political branches' ability to respond to a pressing foreign policy problem.
B. Persistent Complexity in Parsing Presidential Statements
The Hawaii majority also cautioned that courts' need for a "delicate" touch
in handling presidential statements1 2 could result in structural spillover if the
judiciary was not up to that sensitive task. Appreciating the potential for such
spillover does not entitle the President to absolute deference on both constitu-
tional and statutory claims-indeed, the Hawaii majority's excessive defer-
ence regarding the challengers' statutory claim is the primary subject of this
Article. However, the potential for spillover does counsel caution, particu-
larly in fashioning constitutional rules.
As an example, consider a statement that Justice Sotomayor cited in her
Hawaii dissent10 3 as proving President Trump's discriminatory purpose: his
observation in March, 2017 that EO-2 was a "watered-down version" of EO-
1,104 which courts had struck down as reflecting impermissible animus. In
fairness, President Trump's March, 2017 description of EO-2 was not the
most damning evidence of animus with respect to the succession of entry
restrictions in that year. That title doubtless belongs to then candidate
Trump's call for a "total and complete shutdown of Muslim immigration to
the United States."' Nevertheless, President Trump's March 2017 descrip-
tion of EO-2 appears prominently in Justice Sotomayor's dissent. As it turns
out, this common description means quite different things to different people,
as Supreme Court precedent and Justice Sotomayor's own dissent proved.
99. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157, § (b)(1)(C) note.
100. See Josh Blackman, The Legality of the 31617 Executive Order, Part III: The Establishment
Clause, Josh Blackman's Blog (March 15, 2017), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/03/15/the-legality-
of-the-3617-executive-order-part-iii-the-establishment-clause/ (discussing background of legislation).
101. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418-19 (asserting that complex judgments about foreign
affairs "'are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive' than
the courts) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)).
102. Id. at 2418.
103. Id. at 2437.
104. See Devlin Barrett, Officials to appeal travel-ban ruling, WASH. POST, March 18, 2017, at A4.
105. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2436 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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According to Justice Sotomayor, President Trump's characterization of
EO-2 as "watered-down" constituted an admission that EO-2 entailed only
cosmetic changes from EO-i, which courts had already invalidated. For
Justice Sotomayor, the "watered down" description thus confirmed that EO-2
contained the same anti-Muslim bias that had contaminated EO-i.1 °6
However, Justice Sotomayor's subtle framing of President Trump's language
contributed heavily to this impression.10 7 According to Justice Sotomayor,
Trump told a political rally shortly after issuance of EO-2 that this second
iteration of the entry ban was "just a 'watered-down version of the first' ban,
which the Administration had revoked after its poor judicial reception.10 8
Justice Sotomayor inserted the word, "just,"-here meaning "only" or
"merely" 0 9-immediately before President Trump's phrase, "watered-down
version." This seemingly mundane interpolation does a great deal of work,
prodding the reader toward Justice Sotomayor's view that the phrase con-
notes a purely superficial change. Without Justice Sotomayor's interpolation,
the phrase "watered-down" stands on its own. In that stark light, its meaning
is fundamentally different, as both longstanding Supreme Court readings and
usage elsewhere in Justice Sotomayor's dissent illustrate.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly read the term, "watered-down," in a
sense precisely opposite to Justice Sotomayor's in the above passage: as con-
noting a material change, not merely a surface alteration. In Malloy v.
106. In this passage, Justice Sotomayor may have been thinking of the definition in the Cambridge
English Dictionary. See Watered-down, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://dictionary.
cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/watered-down (last visited July 22, 2018) (explaining that "watered-
down idea or opinion has been made less extreme than it originally was, usually so that people are more
likely to accept it"). However, this definition does not necessarily support Justice Sotomayor's account,
since "less extreme" can refer to changes that are substantial, not merely superficial. The other common
definition reinforces that "watered-down" connotes substantial changes. See Watered-down, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/water%20down (last
visited July 22, 2018) (explaining that the verb, "water down," means "to reduce or temper the force or
effectiveness of"). Merriam-Webster's example confirms that the phrase refers to modifying an item to
substantially alter its nature or use. See id. (as an example, positing bars or restaurants that "watered down
the cocktails while jacking up their prices"); see also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 353 (1977) (asserting that in passing law barring racial discrimination in employment, Congress did
not "destroy or water down" seniority rights of current white employees); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493, 500 (1967) (cautioning that police officers must receive more than "watered-down version" of
constitutional rights); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2237 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring)
(critiquing tendency to "water down strict scrutiny to something unrecognizable").
107. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 271-72 (2011) (in discussing "framing
effects," noting that "large changes in preferences ... are sometimes caused by inconsequential variations
in the wording of a choice problem").
108. Hawaii, 137 S. Ct. at 2437 (emphasis added). Video of President Trump's comment is widely
available. See Trump: Judge blocked a 'watered down' travel ban, POLITICO, March 16, 2017, https://
www.politico.com/video/2017/03/trump-judge-blocked-a-watered-down-travel-ban-O62492; see also
Louis Nelson, Trump slams Justice Department for 'watered down' travel ban, POLITICO, June 5, 2017,
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/05/trump-travel-ban-justice-department-239131 (quoting President
Trump as tweeting that Justice Department lawyers "should have stayed with the original Travel Ban, not the
watered-down, politically correct version they submitted" to the Supreme Court).
109. The Cambridge Dictionary includes this as the third meaning of the word. See Just, CAMBRIDGE
ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/just (last visited
Aug. 3, 2018).
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Hogan,110 the Court held that, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Fifth Amendment's rule against compelled self-incrimination applied to the
states.1 To find this robust incorporation, the Court had to determine
whether the Fourteenth Amendment mandated state compliance with the
strong array of Bill of Rights protections that the Warren Court had
advanced, or with a vastly diluted substitute. Writing for the Court, Justice
Brennan denied that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed on states only a
"'watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of
Rights.' 1 12 The "watered-down" version that Justice Brennan disavowed
would have entailed a material diminution in the vigor of rights protections.
The Malloy Court emphatically rebuffed that result. Justice William 0.
Douglas, concurring in in the 1963 landmark right-to-counsel case, Gideon v.
Wainwright,"3 advanced the same understanding of the phrase "watered-
down" as connoting a radical reduction.114 More recently, in McDonald v.
City of Chicago,"' the Court declared that the full force of Second
Amendment protections applied to the states, instead of the radically diluted
"watered-down" version that the municipal defendant had advanced.6
Indeed, Justice Sotomayor's tendency in dissents-exemplified in the travel
ban case and previously 7-has been to use "watered down" as a descriptor in
precisely the same way as other Supreme Court opinions: as connoting a mate-
rial dilution. In her travel ban dissent, Justice Sotomayor relied on this meaning
to criticize the majority opinion, which she faulted for mistaken application of a
"watered-down legal standard,"' 8 mere pages after suggesting that the opposite
meaning applied to President Trump's rhetoric. Reinforcing her reliance on the
accepted judicial meaning of the phrase, Justice Sotomayor suggested that the
majority had embarked on "an effort to short circuit" constitutional guaran-
tees. 9 Of course, either short-circuiting or watering down the Bill of Rights
would entail a profound change in American constitutionalism. That shift is far
more substantial than the purely superficial change that Justice Sotomayor
attributed to President Trump's use of the same language.
110. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
111. Cf. Peter Margulies, Enjoining the Revised Refugee EO. The Hawaii District Court "Waters
Down" the Separation of Powers, LAWFARE, March 30, 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/enjoining-
revised-refugee-eo-hawaii-district-court-waters-down-separation-powers.
112. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10-11 (citing Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
113. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
114. Id. at 346 (rejecting view that Bill of Rights protections governing the states pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment are "lesser" or "watered-down" versions of the robust protections that constrain
the federal government).
115. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
116. Id. at 765 (noting that the Court had decisively "abandoned 'the notion that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies.., a watered-down version" of the Bill of Rights to the states) (citing Malloy, 378
U.S. at 10-11).
117. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 261 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (asserting
that majority's position will "water down" the standard governing unreliable eyewitness identifications).
118. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2440.
119. Id.
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Admittedly, President Trump's often crass public utterances are not the
most obvious case study in the subtleties of multiple meanings.120 Perhaps
more than any president in history, Donald Trump has regularly issued public
pronouncements that have sparked legitimate outrage. However, Trump's
dismal track record actually reinforces the majority's wariness about he
"delicate" task of parsing presidential statements.121 If distinguished judges
can mangle even the meaning of Trump's florid pronouncements, parsing
presidential language may spawn a dangerous spillover that unduly encum-
bers future White House occupants.
C. The Hawaii Majority's Methodological Travails
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Establishment Clause's tangled jurisprudence
caused headaches for both the dissent and the majority. In his opinion for the
Court, Chief Justice Roberts offered not one, but two possible standards of
review: "facially legitimate and bona fide," and rational basis.22
Unfortunately, the case law's guidance regarding EO-3 is more equivocal
than the majority claimed it to be. Indeed, the decisions that Chief Justice
Roberts cited in his rational basis analysis point to a far more probing review.
1. EO-3 and Facial Legitimacy
The Court first articulated the "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard
in the 1972 case of Kleindienst v. Mandel.123 In Mandel, the Court considered
the lawfulness of the government's denial of a nonimmigrant visa to a foreign
academic with avowedly "revolutionary Marxist" views whom U.S. citizens
120. Moreover, as Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent, Trump's campaign comments were at
least as troubling as the comments that the Court had held constituted "hostility" toward religion requiring
invalidation of a state decision against a baker who refused to produce a specialty cake for a same-sex
couple. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2446-47 (citing Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm'n,
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729-30 (2018) (criticizing state commissioner's express refusal to permit respondent's
religious belief to "justify" conduct that would otherwise clearly violate state antidiscrimination law)).
121. Id. at 2418. One commentator has suggested that courts u e statements by candidates or public
officials only regarding the issue of intent. See Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit. Presidential
Speech in the Courts, 96 TEx. L. REV. 721 (2017). While that approach makes sense, the Hawaii majority
was correct that parsing even such statements in the foreign affairs arena presents special problems. For
the same reason, earlier Establishment Clause decisions considering statements are not foolproof guides
for the realm of foreign affairs. Those cases address religious practice. For example, in McCreary County,
Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., the Supreme Court held that a courthouse display of the Ten
Commandments that the legislature had endorsed .'in remembrance and honor of Jesus Christ"' violated
the Establishment Clause. 545 U.S. 844, 851 (2005), In Larson v. Valente, the Court invalidated a state
law that curbed religious congregations' fundraising outside of the proverbial "passing the hat" in church
services. 456 U.S. 228, 254 (1982). One legislator described his colleagues as "hot to regulate the
Moonies." Id. at 254. Candidate and President Trump's comments, while clearly outside the pale, do not
address religious practice. While those comments should not be out of bounds for courts, their relation-
ship to foreign affairs and national security merits special judicial care to avoid chilling future occupants
of the White House who will one hopes find Presidents Washington and Eisenhower to be sounder
guides. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2418 (noting past presidential statements). The statutory argument
against EO-3 advanced in this Article relies on structure and past practice, and therefore makes reliance
on presidential statements unnecessary.
122. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419-20.
123. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,769 (1972).
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had invited to speak.124 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, found
that the exclusion was "facially legitimate and bona fide" and hence did not
violate the First Amendment. Supporting this conclusion, Justice Blackmun
related the State Department's assertion125 that the applicant had abused the
terms of a previous visa by participating in fundraising activities in the
United States which his prior visa had not expressly authorized.
In Kerry v. Din,1 26 the Court, this time with a concurrence by Justice
Kennedy that was necessary for an outcome in the government's favor, held
that the State Department had met the "facially legitimate and bona fide"
standard when it denied a visa to an Afghan national seeking to enter the
United States as an immigrant. The visa applicant and his spouse, a U.S. citi-
zen, argued that the State Department had violated the due process rights of
the U.S. citizen spouse by declining to even identify the specific ground of
inadmissibility that the State Department relied on in denying the application.
Instead of identifying the specific ground, the government had informed the
applicant and his spouse only that the denial was based on a national security
provision, which describes "dozens" of provisions in the INA. 127 In explain-
ing that the failure to identify a specific subsection of the INA did not violate
the "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard, Justice Kennedy asserted
that the visa applicant had worked for the Taliban, supplying a neutral basis
for the consular officer's concern. 
128
In Hawaii, President Trump's statements provide a disturbing backdrop
not present in either Mandel or Din. Consider merely the statements made by
candidate Trump cited by Chief Justice Roberts in his opinion for the Court.
In a statement unlike any made by a major party presidential candidate in
more than seventy years, candidate Trump called for a "total and complete
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.' 129 This call, included in a
"Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration," remained on the Trump
campaign's website until May 2017.13 That single statement, widely publi-
cized during the campaign, was a far more sweeping and derogatory general-
ization about a religious group than anything in the earlier Supreme Court
cases articulating the "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard. To fully
explain its finding that Trump's statements did not adversely affect EO-3's
compliance with Mandel, the majority needed to do more than dutifully list a
couple of the many troubling statements that candidate Trump had uttered or
highlight the "delicate" nature of parsing statements by candidates and sitting
presidents. It would have been appropriate o forthrightly assess whether the
statements vitiated the stated grounds for EO-3's restrictions. The majority's
124. Id. at 756.
125. Id. at 757-58.
126. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 2145 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2417.
130. Id.
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failure to integrate candidate Trump's statements into its analysis of EO-3
left a yawning gap at the heart of its opinion.
2. EO-Ys Vulnerability Under "Rational Basis with Bite"
The majority's treatment of rational basis review is even more troubling
than its handling of the facially legitimate and bona fide standard. This sec-
tion of the majority opinion has two tracks. One track applies rational basis
review with the Court's customary layer of deference, relying on the govern-
ment's stated justifications and prognostications about the future. The other
track cites Supreme Court precedent, including City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center.131 These latter cases use an approach long ago named "rational
basis with bite,' 132 entailing a more bracing form of means-ends scrutiny. In
the Hawaii majority opinion, this more rigorous scrutiny was nowhere in evi-
dence. The result is a marked lack of support for the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Roberts noted that Cleburne actually involved relatively
searching scrutiny of a local ordinance that required a special permit for the
operation of a group home for persons with mental retardation.33 In holding
that the ordinance did not pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Cleburne Court asserted that it was applying rational basis review.34
Nevertheless, the Court's review turned out to be quite searching in practice.
The Court found that the ordinance was radically underinclusive, since the
town's chosen means for addressing its stated goals failed to address a large
swath of conduct that apparently undermined those objectives. In defending
the ordinance, the town listed rationales for the special permit requirement
such as concerns about traffic, congestion, and the group home's location
within a portion of the town that climate scientists had estimated could flood
every 500 years.35 However, the ordinance did not impose the special permit
requirement on other uses in the area, such as fraternity houses, dormitories,
and hospitals, that might pose similar concerns.36 This marked underinclu-
siveness demonstrated that the ordinance did not stem from a rational tailor-
ing of means to goals. Once the Court found that the ordinance did not reflect
a rational matching of means to ends, that left one plausible explanation for
131. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
132. Cf. Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1317, 1319-
33 (2018) (arguing that rational basis review often offers more probing review, even outside the "rational
basis with bite" line of precedent).
133. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420 (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448-50).
134. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-47 (declining to hold that persons with mental retardation constituted
a quasi-suspect class such that classifications that disadvantaged the group required intermediate scru-
tiny). The Court cited concerns that this Article has cited under the rubric of structural spillover: accord-
ing to Justice White, who wrote for the Court, people with mental retardation have "wide variation in ...
abilities and needs," calling for "flexibility" on the part of government in efforts to respond to those needs.
Id. at 445.
135. Id. at 449-50.
136. Id. at 447-50.
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the measure: impermissible animus.13 7 The Court's searching scrutiny stands
in stark contrast o the minimal scrutiny that the Hawaii majority applied to
EO-3.
This marked lack of means-ends fit also figured heavily in the two other
rational basis review cases cited by the majority.138 In Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, the Court found the fit inadequate in a federal statu-
tory provision that barred receipt of food stamps by households comprised of
unrelated people. The government had suggested that the provision would
deter fraud, on the theory that people who are unrelated are more likely to
form a household for purely expedient reasons such as access to food
stamps.3 9 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, dismissed this argu-
ment, noting that the statute already contained an array of anti-fraud provi-
sions that more closely targeted the conduct at issue.140 In addition, the Court
noted, the statute was underinclusive: Individuals intent on fraud could apply
for food stamps as individuals and structure their living arrangements to form
separate households under the statute, thereby evading the bar.14 1 The statute
was also over-inclusive: according to Justice Brennan, individuals not able to
restructure their living arrangements in this way were more likely to be per-
sons actually eligible for benefits, such as indigent mothers with dependent
children who wished to share housing to reduce costs and make their scant
income go further.14 2 That overinclusiveness drove the Court's holding that
the statute at issue was unconstitutional.
In Romer v. Evans, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, struck
down an amendment to the Colorado constitution that barred any future mea-
sure safeguarding the rights of gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals. While
the Court held that the Colorado constitutional provision violated equal pro-
tection because it singled out this group for special legal obstacles, Justice
Kennedy also mentioned the means-ends fit analysis that the Colorado
Supreme Court had applied.43 Colorado had sought to justify the measure on
137. The oral argument provides a flavor of the Cleburne Court's focus on the means-ends nexus.
For example, when the attorney for the town mentioned the proposed group home's location on a 500-
year flood plain, Justice Rehnquist asked whether the city had a "general policy against building" in this
area. The town's attorney conceded that the town had not barred construction for other non-group home
uses. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432 (No. 84-468). Later, in a textbook case
of how not to respond to a question from the bench, the following exchange occurred: Justice Stevens
asked the town's lawyer about the factual finding made by the district court that the town permitted many
other uses in the area that were the same in all pertinent respects as the group home. Id. at 9. The town's
lawyer maintained that the finding of the district court was not "material here." Id. Justice Stevens replied,
"Well, it is pretty material to me, I will tell you that." Id. at 10.
138. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420 (citing United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973) and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
139. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535.
140. Id. at 536-37.
141. Id. at537.
142. Id. at 537-538 (noting provision's adverse impact would fall principally on individuals "so des-
perately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their
eligibility").
143. Romer, 517 U.S. at 629,631.
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the ground that barring protection for gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals
conserved resources for combating discrimination against suspect classes,
such as racial minorities.144 The Colorado Supreme Court had rejected this
argument as underinclusive, noting that Colorado law also protected many
other non-suspect classes defined by an array of traits such as "age, military
status, marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, custody of a minor child, politi-
cal affiliation, [or] physical or mental disability of an individual or his or her
associates." Yet Colorado did not subject this legion of other groups to the
special legal disabilities the constitutional amendment had imposed on per-
sons who were gay, lesbian, or bisexual.14 The Colorado amendment's fail-
ure to demonstrate means-ends fit was part of the backdrop for the Supreme
Court's holding that invidious animus was the only plausible explanation for
the measure.146
3. EO-3's Failure to Fit the Cleburne Rational Basis Cases
Nothing in the Hawaii majority opinion even approached the robust
means-ends scrutiny in the Cleburne line of cases. The majority's principal
substitute for that bracing inquiry was a reference to the "worldwide review
process" that supposedly undergirded EO-3.147 A Court less inclined to me-
chanical deference might have asked itself how that worldwide process con-
ducted by "multiple Cabinet officials ' 148 in the administration of President
Donald Trump had sealed itself off from candidate Trump's noxious state-
ments. Moreover, a Court that was conscientious about its reliance on
Cleburne could also have simply decided that the proof was in the pudding.
That hardheaded look at EO-3 would have amply demonstrated its failure to
pass muster.
EO-3 suffers from the same manifest lack of fit that marred the measures
that the Court struck down in Cleburne and the other rational basis cases cited
by the Hawaii majority. With respect to the persons that the order covers,
EO-3 is both over- and underinclusive. The same two flaws plague the list of
countries in EO-3. I discuss each in turn.
EO-3 is overinclusive regarding the categories of individuals covered. As
Justice Sotomayor indicated in her dissent, EO-3's restrictions on immi-
grants' entry cover infants and others who cannot possibly pose a threat.
149
Vetting adults can be challenging, although consular officials perform that
task hundreds of thousands of times per year. Vetting young children requires
little more than a doctor's note and a DNA test. Moreover, children under the
age of 12 rarely have criminal records or terrorist experience that would
144. Id. at 631,635.
145. Evans v. Romer, 882P.2d 1335,1346n.9 (Colo. 1994) (cited in Romer, 517 U.S. at 629).
146. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
147. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2421.
148. Id.
149. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2445 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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render them inadmissible. Information security is also not a major concern
for this group; young children will typically not need to cover up travel that
might raise concerns, such as efforts to join ISIS forces in Syria or Iraq.
Finally, a young child is unlikely to have skeletons in his or her closet that
would remain under wraps until after the child's entry into the United States
and is also not likely to commit crimes immediately after her entry. For this
cohort, a foreign country's cooperation on removal from the United States is
irrelevant. Vetting young children surely does not require the sweeping
restrictions imposed by EO-3.
The categories of individuals covered by EO-3 also show obvious underin-
clusiveness. EO-3 imposes few restrictions on nonimmigrant visa applicants,
such as students, tourists, or business travelers.50 While Chief Justice
Roberts cited this as a factor showing that EO-3 did not target Muslims per
se,15 1 the exemption of most nonimmigrants is more compelling as evidence
of EO-3's lack of means-ends fit. 1 52 Students, tourists, and business travel-
ers pose far greater potential national security threats than infants do.
Indeed, the 9/11 hijackers all entered the United States on nonimmigrant
visas.1 53 If difficulties with vetting apply to infants, those difficulties apply
with far greater force to students, tourists, and other nonimmigrant visa
applicants. Moreover, since nonimmigrants' countries of origin value the
ability of their nationals to obtain an education or business opportunities in
the United States, the exemption for this group lessens the leverage that
EO-3 may gain over countries to drive improvements in vetting. EO-3's
carve-out for this group thus casts substantial doubt on the nexus between
the measure's stated goals and the means it employs.
EO-3's list of covered countries also fails to fit the measure's goals.5 4
Those goals are three-fold: a country should collaborate with the United
States and the international community regarding, 1) sound, up-to-date
identity-management protocols, including issuance of electronic passports
embedded with the passport-holder's biographic and biometric data and
providing information to other countries and international organizations
about lost or stolen passports; 2) national security and public-safety infor-
mation, such as data about terrorism or security threats; and, 3) national se-
curity and public-safety risk assessment, including repatriation of its own
nationals subject to a final order of removal in the United States.
1 55
150. Id.
151. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2422.
152. Id. at 2445 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
153. David Johnston, 6 Months Late, I.N.S. Notifies Flight School of Hijackers' Visas, N.Y. TIMEs,
March 13, 2002, at A16 (noting that half a year after September 11 attacks, immigration officials had sent
an education institution notices that it had approved student visas for two of the hijackers, including the
U.S. ringleader, Mohamed Atta).
154. See Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty, supra note 18, at 63-65.
155. See EO-3, § 1(c).
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First consider the identity-management issue. Viewed from one perspective,
EO-3 is over-inclusive.5 6 Four of the listed countries-Iran, Libya, Somalia,
and Venezuela-issue electronic passports.157 Moreover, the respected intema-
tional law enforcement agency, Interpol, has described Iran as "very strong" in
sharing information on lost or stolen passports,158 while Libya, Somalia, Syria,
and Venezuela also share significant data.159 Demonstrating its lack of means-
ends fit, EO-3 is also demonstrably under-inclusive on identity management.
Almost 100 unlisted countries do not issue electronic passports.1 60 Moreover,
over 150 unlisted countries are either sparing or completely silent regarding lost
or stolen passports.
1 61
On sharing national security and public-safety data, the listed country
Yemen uses a system developed in the United States-the Personal
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES)-to
report terrorist incidents.1 62 For its part, Iran coordinates with the Iraqi gov-
ernment and with Syria in the armed conflict with ISIS, in which the United
States also plays a vital role.1 63 To be effective, this collaboration must
involve some information-sharing. Whether U.S. officials consider that
degree of information-sharing to be sufficient is difficult to discern from the
face of EO-3, which provides no objective baseline for this factor regarding
the frequency or volume of information-sharing expected.
Moving to acceptance of nationals with a U.S. final order of removal,
1 64
EO-3's lack of fit is also salient. Among the countries covered by EO-3, the
United States has designated only Iran as failing to cooperate.1 65 Many
unlisted countries practice noncooperation that is far broader in scope.
According to the conservative Center for Immigration Studies, as of the mid-
dle of 2016 there were 2,718 Iranians with final orders of removal who
remained in the United States; 901 of those Iranian nationals had committed
156. Analyst David Bier of the Cato Institute has undertaken the most diligent and methodical review
of EO-3's criteria. See David Bier, Travel Ban is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective Criteria, CATO
AT LIBERTY (Oct. 9, 2017); see also Brief for Amicus Curiae The Cato Institute in Support of
Respondents, Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965 (March 23, 2018), https://www.cato.org/blog/travel-ban-
based-executive-whim-not-objective-criteria; https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-965/
39755/20180323095217542 Cato%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf (discussing sources).
157. Int'l Civ. Aviation Org. (ICAO), ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD) Participants, https://icao.
int/Security/FAL/PKD/Pages/ICAO-PKDParticipants.aspx.
158. Bier, supra note 156.
159. Id.
160. Id.; ICAO, supra note 157.
161. Bier, supra note 156; U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Passport Fraud: An International Vulnerability (Apr. 4,
2014) (testimony of officials Alan Bersin and John Wagner), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/04/04/
written-testimony-plcy-office-intemationa-affairs-and-cbp-office-field-operations.
162. Bier, supra note 157; U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, at 25, 234
(describing Chad and reporting on Yemen, respectively), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
272488.pdf.
163. Bier, supra note 157.
164. EO-3,§ l(c)(iii).
165. Bier, supra note 157.
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crimes in the United States that were the basis for their removal orders.166 In
contrast, unlisted Vietnam had 8,437 total nationals in the United States sub-
ject to final orders of removal; 7,560 of those cases involved orders of re-
moval arising out of criminal convictions here. Compared with Iran, Vietnam
has over 800% more foreign nationals in the United States subject to final
orders of removal based on criminal convictions. Another unlisted country,
Laos, has 3,755 foreign nationals subject to final orders of removal for crimi-
nal convictions in the United States: that is 400% more than Iran.167 Yet Laos
has been subject only to sanctions imposed on its government officials and
their dependents who wish to travel to the United States, while the United
States has imposed no sanctions on Vietnam. These are just two of the many
unlisted countries whose nationals with crime-based orders of removal far
exceed those of Iran.
168
While courts should not seek to micromanage the details of immigration
policy, EO-3's lack of fit on repatriation of nationals with crime-based re-
moval orders is telling. Iran's noncooperation, which is far exceeded by
other, non-covered countries, represents the best case for matching EO-3's
means to its stated goals. Yet, even here, EO-3 uses a sledgehammer to
squash a gnat. The modest relative scope of Iran's noncooperation and the
lack of evidence of noncooperation by other listed countries in this regard
both illustrate EO-3's mismatch between ends and means.
4. The Hawaii Majority's Tepid Response
Instead of addressing EO-3's manifest lack of means-ends fit, the Hawaii
majority gestured toward three features of EO-3: its provisions for waivers,
periodic review, and exceptions for nonimmigrants. None of these features
materially enhances EO-3's means-ends fit.
As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, the waiver appears to be both opa-
que in operation and largely illusory in practice.169 To obtain a waiver, a non-
citizen from the affected countries must show that: 1) denying entry would
cause the noncitizen "undue hardship;" 2) entry would not pose a threat to
the U.S.; and 3) entry would be "in the national interest.' 17 The government
has offered only sparse guidance on how individuals can meet the above
criteria, particularly the "undue hardship" prong.171 Moreover, the State
166. See Jessica Vaughan, The Non-Departed: 925,000 Aliens Ordered Removed Are Still Here,
Center for Immigration Stud. (June 30, 2016), https://cis.org/Vaughan/NonDeparted-925000-Aliens-
Ordered-Removed-Are-Still-Here.
167. Id. Similarly exceeding Iran, Cambodia had 1,464 nationals subject to final orders of removal
based on criminal convictions.
168. Id.; cf. Aline Barros, Trump Administration Strikes Multiple Deportation Deals; What's in
Them?, VOICE OF AMERICA, March 3, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/trump-administration-multiple-
deportation-pacts/4279219.html (noting that current list of "recalcitrant" countries also includes China,
Eritrea, Hong Kong, and Myanmar).
169. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2341 (2018).
170. EO-3, § 3(c).
171. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2431.
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Department has granted only a "miniscule" number of waivers, even to indi-
viduals who would seem to have a strong prima facie case of undue hardship,
such as children requiring medical treatment.172 This is not the kind of careful
tailoring that the Cleburne line of cases requires.
The periodic review process173 similarly fails the tailoring test. Just as it is
artificial to separate the various iterations of the travel ban from the signals
sent by candidate Trump, any periodic review will necessarily reflect
President Trump's toxic influence. Since EO-3 lacks means-ends fit, believ-
ing that a periodic review presided over by the same players will do better
typifies the triumph of hope over experience. Chief Justice Roberts flagged
the Trump administration's removal of three countries-Iraq, Sudan, and
Chad-from the list of countries covered by various iterations of the travel
ban.17 4 Given the under- and overinclusive nature of EO-3 and the countries
still covered, the removal of these three countries barely scratches the surface
of EO-3's arbitrary nature.
Finally, the exceptions for nonimmigrant visas do not perform the tailoring
job that the drafters of EO-3 failed to do at its inception. As Justice Breyer
pointed out in his dissent, officials have approved only a small number of stu-
dent visas from listed countries.175 These numbers constitute a mere fraction
of the number of visas that earlier administrations had approved annually.76
If this is tailoring at all, it is truly shoddy merchandise.
Shorn of this excess fabric, the Hawaii majority's argument for EO-3's
constitutional validity reduces to the familiar theme of deference. For exam-
ple, Chief Justice Roberts cited to his earlier opinion for the Court in Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project,177 in which the Court expressed reluctance
about second-guessing Congress's judgment on "sensitive and weighty inter-
ests of national security and foreign policy." 78 However, in this respect,
Humanitarian Law Project is another example of the spillover of deferential
decisions on judicial credibility and independence. In that decision, the Court
upheld a statute that prohibited "material support" to groups designated by
172. Id. For example, a ten-year-old with cerebral palsy received a waiver only after Supreme Court
justices inquired specifically about her case during the travel ban oral argument. See Center for
Constitutional Rights & Yale Law School Rule of Law Clinic, Window Dressing the Muslim Ban:
Reports of Waivers and Mass Denials from Yemeni-American Families Stuck in Limbo 19 (June 2018),
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/06/CCR YLS June2018 Report Window-Dressing-
the-Muslim-Ban.pdf.
173. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2422.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2432 (noting that 258 student visas were issued for Iranians, 29 for Libyans, 40 for
Yemenis, and none for Somalians). The Hawaii plaintiffs will have an opportunity to demonstrate the
waiver provisions' inadequacy in federal district court, where the case returned for proceedings on perma-
nent injunctive relief after the Supreme Court vacated the preliminary injunction issued below. See
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (2018) (noting that,
"[o]n remand, discovery can now proceed, and evidence of government discrimination in individual cases
can be introduced").
176. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2433 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
177. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
178. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2422 (citing Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 33-34).
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the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).179 Violations
of the statute at issue in Humanitarian Law Project entailed specific conduct
by individuals who coordinated their actions with FTOs. The Court's ration-
ale for upholding the statute did not encompass government action against
persons who had committed no specific conduct, but merely happened to be
close relatives of U.S. citizens or other otherwise visa-eligible individuals
affected by EO-3. In citing this language from Humanitarian Law Project de-
spite its lack of application to the different context of EO-3, the majority in
Hawaii inadvertently demonstrated that spillover happens in both directions,
tilting future courts toward inapposite deference as well as sometimes risking
impairment of the political branches' prerogatives.
IV. CONTROLLING EXECUTIVE EXCESS: CONTEXT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
AVOIDANCE IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The poor fit of EO-3 under the Cleburne line of probing rational basis
cases should have driven the Court to a different method and outcome: find-
ing that EO-3 exceeded Congress's delegation to the Executive under the
INA. Two sturdy strands of statutory interpretation could have achieved this
result: 1) the avoidance doctrine, which would have relied on the
Constitution in reading the INA to preclude EO-3's sweeping assertion of ex-
ecutive power,18° and, 2) administrative law's "major questions" doctrine,18
which would have relied on the INA's structure and on past practice. These
doctrines are related: avoidance cases may also cite statutory structure and
past practice, while major-questions decisions sometimes unfold against the
backdrop of the constitutional concern with excessive delegations to adminis-
trative agencies. The Court has relied on both approaches to combat execu-
tive branch excess. Either would have sidestepped the methodological
problems engendered by the contradiction between the probing scrutiny of
the Cleburne line of precedent and the uncritical deference that the Hawaii
Court displayed toward EO-3.
A. Avoidance and Blunting Invidious Impacts: The Japanese-American
Internment Cases
The blinkered deference of the Hawaii majority actually compares unfav-
orably with the Court's earlier handling of the legal challenges to the
Japanese-American internment. Justice Sotomayor did not go this far in her
vigorous dissenting opinion; she limited herself to asserting that the majority
179. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B.
180. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 71; Adrian Vermeule, Saving
Constructions, 85 GEo. L.J. 1945 (1997); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms,
and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1549 (2000); see also Ryan D. Doerfler, High-
States Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REv. 523, 551-60 (2018) (discussing interaction between stakes in
given decision and level of plausibility required in reading statute to avoid constitutional problems).
181. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
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opinion reprised the structural spillover that Justice Jackson warned about in
his Korematsu dissent. Terming the majority opinion an echo of Korematsu
elicited an indignant denial by Chief Justice Roberts.18 2 However, Ex Parte
Endo,183 the Court's final word on the internment, illustrates that the Court
ultimately brought down the curtain on this appalling episode by invoking
the same avoidance canon that the Hawaii majority disdained.184
In Endo, Justice William 0. Douglas, writing for the Court, held that the
Executive lacked statutory authority to detain concededly loyal Japanese-
Americans. Douglas noted that such detention would offend the Due Process
Clause, as well as fundamental notions of fairness, by detaining individuals
without specific evidence of the need for this severe step.185 The government,
by the time the Court announced both Endo and Korematsu on December18,
1944, knew both that the overwhelming majority of detained persons were in
fact loyal and that sorting them out would be straightforward.186 As a practi-
cal matter, therefore, Endo prompted the release of most detainees and paved
the way for the wind-down of the entire internment program.
187
To reach this significant result, Justice Douglas relied on interpretation of
the statute governing the initial evacuation of Japanese-Americans from their
homes on the West Coast. Construing the statute as silent on whether the gov-
ernment could subsequently detain concededly loyal individuals, Douglas
filled the gap with the avoidance canon, which counsels that courts read stat-
utes to avoid substantial constitutional questions. According to Justice
Douglas, the Due Process Clause would have barred the detention of conced-
edly loyal U.S. citizens.188 Citing the avoidance canon, Justice Douglas
182. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
183. Exparte Mitsuyo Endo, 323 U.S. 283,294 (1944).
184. See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 341-46 (1983); Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116
HARV. L. REv. 1933 (2003); cf. Jerry Kang, Watching the Watchers. Enemy Combatants in the
Internment's Shadow, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255, 267 (2005) (suggesting that Endo's use of statutory
interpretation relied more on canon that Court would not assume Congress intended anunconstitutional
result absent a clear statement of Congress's intent rather than on most plausible evidence of shared intent
of the political branches, which indicated that each branch well understood that initiation of forced evacu-
ation of Japanese-Americans from West Coast would result in detention of many loyal U.S. citizens and
lawful residents); Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 512
(1945) (suggesting that the Court "strenuously construed" the statute authorizing evacuation to avoid find-
ing that the law also authorized continued detention of concededly loyal Japanese-Americans). The
approach described in this Article is entirely consistent with describing the avoidance canon as a useful
interpretive convention or legal fiction, as opposed to a method for excavating the likely subjective intent
of a collective body such as Congress. See generally Richard Fallon, Constitutionally Forbidden
Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REv. 523, 538-41 (2016) (discussing difficulties with ascribing intent o
collective body such as legislature).
185. Endo, 323 U.S. at 299 & n. 23 (noting that the Court had "consistently given a narrower scope"
to legislation that "appeared on its face to violate a specific prohibition of Constitution") (citing, inter
alia, Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
186. ERIC L. MULLER, AMERICAN INQUISITION: THE HUNT FOR JAPANESE AMERICAN DISLOYALTY IN
WORLD WAR 11 (2007) (discussing evolution of loyalty examinations for internees); cf. Kermit Roosevelt,
ALLEGIANCE 316-31 (2015) (providing fictionalized but well-sourced account of loyalty process).
187. Irons, supra note 184, at 345.
188. Endo, 323 U.S. at 299.
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construed the statute in light of the Due Process Clause as not authorizing
that drastic option.189
The avoidance canon did a great deal of work in Endo. Viewed strictly as a
matter of parsing Congress's likely intent, Endo seems contrived: as Justice
Roberts noted in his concurrence, in enacting a statute requiring compliance
with military orders governing evacuation, Congress almost certainly con-
templated that mass detention would follow.190 That said, the majority opin-
ion in Endo enabled the Court to manage structural spillover. As Korematsu
demonstrated, the Court was unwilling to hold that the Constitution barred
the entire internment program from its inception.91 That reluctance was
"gravely wrong," as the Hawaii majority somewhat belatedly acknowl-
edged.1 92 However, that tragic reticence rested on a fear, alluded to by Justice
Douglas in Endo,193 that a broad constitutional holding would chill the gov-
ernment's ability to respond to national security threats. At the same time,
Endo showed that a majority of the Court was unwilling to lend its imprima-
tur to the most plausible reading of Congress's enactment, which would have
authorized the indefinite and indiscriminate detention of Japanese-Americans
that in fact occurred. As the threat from Japan eased in the dwindling days of
the war and the harsh reality of internment began to sink in for many
Americans, the Court saw a need to reassert the values of the Due Process
Clause to restrain future government excesses and mitigate the courts' com-
plicity.194 Endo's avoidance-based statutory holding enabled the Court to
achieve these goals, albeit in an imperfect fashion. At least in this respect, the
Court's overall adjudication of the Japanese-American internment was supe-
rior to the Hawaii Court's heedless upholding of EO-3.
B. The Court and the Cold War
In cases responding to the repression wrought by McCarthyism and the
Cold War, the Court also made robust use of statutory interpretation.
1 95
189. Id.
190. Id. at 309 (noting that Congress in exercising oversight over the executive branch held extensive
hearings and received reports on the government Relocation Authority implementing the internment pro-
gram, and appropriated funds for its operation).
191. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944) (asserting that "we are unable to con-
clude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ances-
try from the West Coast war area at the time" of the initial military evacuation order in 1942).
192. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
193. Endo, 323 U.S. at 298-99 (noting that the Constitution "committed to the Executive and to
Congress the exercise of the war power [which] necessarily gave them wide scope for the exercise of
judgment and discretion so that war might be waged effectively and successfully").
194. See Irons, supra note 184, at 323-25 (discussing Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's efforts to
secure consensus on Court); see also id. at 307-08 (noting that briefing to the Court by lawyers in Justice
Department, who had long been troubled by legal defense of the internment program, came close to con-
ceding statutory point).
195. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (holding that Congress had not authorized denying pass-
port because applicant had refused to provide affidavit regarding his alleged Communist Party member-
ship); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956) (holding that Congress had not authorized summary termination
of line-level government employee because of national security concerns); United States v. Rumely, 345
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During this period, the Court, including Justice Felix Frankfurter-the guid-
ing spirit of judicial restraint-frequently alluded to the need to preserve fair-
ness and deliberation. Importantly, however, that concern with structural
spillover emerged in the wake of Dennis v. United States,196 in which a defer-
ential Supreme Court upheld a statute prohibiting membership in an organi-
zation such as the Communist Party that advocated the overthrow of the U.S.
government.197 In Dennis, the opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Vinson
and Justice Frankfurter's extended concurrence both expressed concern about
the consequences of undue judicial intrusion on the political branches.
In Dennis, the Court upheld the Smith Act, which prohibited membership
in organizations that advocated the violent overthrow of the U.S. govern-
ment. Writing for a plurality of four Justices, Chief Justice Vinson placed
structural spillover front and center, noting that the stakes in the case con-
cemed nothing less than government's ability to protect the nation from "vio-
lence, revolution, and terrorism."'1 9 Justices Frankfurter and Jackson
concurred. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence cited the political branches'
duty to safeguard U.S. sovereignty.1 99 For Frankfurter, Congress's power to
outlaw speech calling for the government's violent overthrow dovetailed
with the government's power and duty to secure the country against foreign
threats, including the presumed foreign masters of the U.S. Communist
Party. Quoting from the case that established Congress's plenary power over
immigration, Frankfurter inveighed that the "highest duty of every nation" is
to "preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression
and encroachment."2 Frankfurter, ever the champion of judicial self-
restraint, also invoked the "narrow limits of judicial authority."21
U.S. 41, 44-46 (1953) (construing scope of congressional resolution establishing investigative committee
in light of First Amendment rights of subjects of investigation); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961) (requiring proof of both "active" membership in Communist Party and specific intent to overthrow
government through force and violence); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (reading specific
intent requirement into statute prohibiting membership in Communist Party); Cf ROBERT JUSTIN
GOLDSTEIN, AMERICAN BLACKLIST: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LIST OF SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS
221-35 (2008) (suggesting that Supreme Court decisions reduced impact government's list of subversive
organizations); WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE STUDY IN THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL PROCESS 246 (1962) (describing the Court's brief move in 1959 and 1960 from robust use of
the avoidance canon to greater deference as a "tactical withdrawal, not a rout"); Frickey, supra note 9;
Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance. The Modern Supreme Court and Legal
Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2161-62 (2015) (discussing Court's decision in Rumely); but see
DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 142-44 (2003) (acknowledging Court's role but suggesting that i did not do
enough to address abuses prompted by anti-Communist hysteria).
196. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
197. Almost twenty years later, the Court overruled Dennis and announced that the First
Amendment protected extreme political views, including the abstract advocacy of violence. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); cf Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009-10
(2015) (in case of defendant who had posted material online that others viewed as threatening harm,
requiring proof of specific intent to threaten another with bodily harm as predicate for conviction under
statute prohibiting transmission of threats in interstate commerce).
198. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 501.
199. Id. at 519.
200. Id. (quoting Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,606 (1889)).
201. Id. at 526.
[Vol. 33:159
TAKING STATUTORY CONTEXT SERIOUSLY
With this conclusion out of the way, Justice Frankfurter then turned to the
countervailing concern with structural spillover that would dominate his par-
ticipation in Court decisions on Cold War measures for much of the next dec-
ade. Frankfurter cautioned that the Smith Act "could be used unreasonably
by those in power against hostile or unorthodox views. "202 Justice
Frankfurter directly questioned the wisdom of the Smith Act, warning that
overly zealous efforts to address perceived foreign threats are a "danger
within ourselves ... which will make us ... intolerant, secretive, suspicious,
cruel, and terrified of internal dissension.'2 3 In addition, Frankfurter stressed
the importance of fair procedures, including subjecting government to "the
strictest standards of proof' when it sought to denaturalize or remove an indi-
vidual on ideological grounds.20 4
Heeding Frankfurter's warning, the Court through the 1950s reduced the
risk of structural spillover on the courts prompted by the deferential turn in
Dennis. The avoidance canon was an important element in this array of deci-
sions, but not the only part. For example, in Kent v. Dulles,2 °5 Justice
Frankfurter joined the majority opinion by Justice Douglas holding that the
Passport Act did not delegate to the President the power to deny a passport to
a U.S. citizen who had declined to answer on his application whether he was
or had been a member of the Communist Party. The majority opinion cited
due process and the right to travel as strong factors narrowing the statute's
delegation to the executive branch.20 6 However, avoiding the constitutional
question was not the sole basis for the Court's decision. Instead, Justice
Douglas, following the dissent by Judge Bazelon in the D.C. Circuit,20 7 cited
the long record of administrative practice on passports as not including ques-
tions about Communist Party membership.20 8 Justice Douglas, in cleaning up
202. Id. at 546.
203. Id. at 554-55 (citing George F. Kennan, Where Do You Stand on Communism?, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, May 27, 1951, at 53).
204. Id. at 531; see also id. at 526 (with respect to need for "fairness of procedure" and due regard
for government discretion's "impact on individuals") (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)).
205. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
206. Id. at 129 (terming right to travel a "personal right" within the "liberty" protected by the Fifth
Amendment barring curbs based on an individual's political beliefs and mandating that courts "construe
narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute" this right to be free from content-based regulation by
the state). Subsequent cases indicated that government could impose curbs on travel that were general
not triggered by an individual's beliefs or stemmed from the duties owed to the government by former
government employees. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding general restrictions on travel to
Cuba); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (holding that statute authorized the President to impose gen-
eral curbs on such travel); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 290 (1981) (upholding revocation of former CIA
agent's passport); cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2047, 2101-03 (2005) (praising post-Kent case law as exhibiting appro-
priate deference); but see HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 141 (1990) (criticizing Agee); Jeffrey Kahn, International
Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271, 305-13 (2008) (arguing that post-Kent travel deci-
sions clashed with constitutional norms).
207. Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 580-83 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
208. Kent, 357 U.S. at 127-28 (citing vitiated "allegiance" to the United States, such as service to a
foreign power, and illegal conduct, including passport fraud, as the bases for past denials).
2019]
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Dennis's structural spillover on the courts, also acknowledged the damage
done by Korematsu. Justice Douglas felt obliged to distinguish Korematsu's
holding on the ground that the Court's deference in that case pertained only
to wartime.2 9 Douglas then cited to his earlier opinion in Endo as curbing ex-
cessive delegations that trenched on constitutional values.210
Just as the Cold War Court used statutory interpretation in Kent to protect
U.S. citizens' choices to travel abroad, it also pushed back on government
overreach in immigration law. Here, concerns about statutory structure joined
the avoidance canon. Consider United States v. Witkovich,1" in which Justice
Frankfurter wrote for the Court, which held that the INA limited immigration
officials' detention of a foreign national already slated for deportation.
Congress had enacted a provision whose text appeared to confer wide author-
ity on officials to question foreign nationals, subjecting the latter to criminal
prosecution if they failed to provide the information sought.2 12 The govern-
ment asserted that this provision justified continued detention of a resident
foreign national for the purpose of pressuring that individual to disclose in-
formation about possible current ties to the Communist Party.2 13 Ever the
careful student of statutory structure,214 Frankfurter acknowledged that the
government's power to question a foreign national seemed unbounded under
this provision, if it were read "in isolation and literally."2 However,
Frankfurter rejected what he termed the "tyranny of literalness."2 6 Instead,
Frankfurter read the provision in light of the INA "as a whole," as well as its
legislative history and the avoidance canon.2 17 Informed by these concerns,
Frankfurter found that Congress did not intend to confer upon immigration
officials a power of "broad supervision" resembling the power government
exerts over convicted felons on probation.21 8 Instead of a broad-ranging war-
rant for any and all questions, Frankfurter construed the statute as only
authorizing questions about a foreign national's "availability for deporta-
tion."219 The text of the provision on questions informed Frankfurter's
209. Id. at 128 (noting that "the Nation was then at war ... [n]o such showing of extremity ... has
been made here").
210. Id. at 129.
211. United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957).
212. Id. at 195-96. As written, the statute required that a foreign national in receipt of a final order of
deportation "give information under oath as to his nationality, circumstances, habits, associations, and
activities, and such other information, whether or not related to the foregoing, as the Attorney General
may deem fit and proper," citing then 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(3), 68 Stat. 1232.
213. Witkovich, 353 U.S. at 198-99.
214. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1947).
215. Witkovich, 353 U.S. at 199.
216. Id.
217. Id.; see also United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,44-46 (1953) (invoking avoidance to narrow
congressional resolution establishing investigative committee to inquire into expressive activity); cf.
Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in FELIX FRANKFURTER: THE
JUDGE 30, 52 (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964) (noting that when Frankfurter interpreted a particular statu-
tory provision, "he saw it, not in isolation, but as a part of the historic unfolding of federal statute law...
each statute must be read in the light of the policy expressed in others").
218. Witkovich, 353 U.S. at 200.
219. Id. at 201.
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reading; it did not dictate a result which would have failed to fit the statute as
a whole.220
In pondering the relevance of Frankfurter's approach to the regulation of
entry into the United States by foreign nationals, it is only fair to acknowledge
that the Court through Hawaii has been deferential.221 However, a pathway
for a more robust approach to judicial review is available in Frankfurter's
cogent dissent in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy.222 Against the
same Cold War backdrop, the Court declined to vacate a government finding
that Knauff was inadmissible on national security grounds. Ellen Knauff
was a World War II refugee from Czechoslovakia, whom the Court
acknowledged had served "efficiently and honorably" with both the British
Royal Air Force and the U.S. War Department in Germany. In 1948,
Knauff married a U.S. veteran and became eligible for an immigrant visa
under the War Brides Act, which Congress had enacted to facilitate the
entry of foreign spouses of U.S. service members. The U.S. government
denied her admission, citing national security concems-eventually shown
to be wholly unfounded-that it refused to disclose to Knauff or the Court.
The government relied on a provision giving the President authority to
block the entry of foreign nationals "prejudicial to the interests of the
United States.1223 In Knauff, the Court upheld the government's refusal to
permit Knauff's entry.
The Court's decision in Knauff elicited powerful dissents from Justice
Frankfurter and from Justice Robert Jackson, perhaps the Court's foremost
student of the separation of powers. Each justice asserted that the Court had
failed to grasp the place of the War Brides Act in the INA's overall landscape
and had wrongly read the entry provision in isolation from the rest of the
statute.
Frankfurter noted that Congress passed the War Brides Act to overcome
the barriers to family reunification imposed by the rigid national origin quotas
220. The Court has regularly sought in immigration cases involving LPRs to interpret the INA in a
fashion that promoted fair notice and avoided needless forfeitures of legal status. See Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) (arguing that courts have relied on statutory construction to tem-
per immigration law). However, when Congress has made its intentions clear, the Court has typically
been deferential. Compare Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (holding that Constitution did
not prohibit Congress from expressly authorizing retroactive application of INA provision making
Communist Party membership basis for removal), with INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315-16 (2001)
(declining to construe immigration statute as retroactive absent clear statement from Congress); cf. Nancy
Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 97
(1998) (asserting that Constitution bars retroactive application); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social
Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1889 (2000) (canvassing political and legal correlates of harsh immigration laws and recommending judi-
cial responses).
221. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing "'Congress's
plenary power to make rules for the admission"' of foreign nationals) (citation omitted).
222. United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 541-42 (1950); see also Charles D.
Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz
Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1995).
223. This was a predecessor of today's 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1), a cognate of § 1182(f).
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then in effect. In the War Brides Act, Congress recognized the "dominant
regard which American society places upon the family." '224 Allowing the
fruits of that recognition to be "arbitrarily ... taken away" by government
"fiat" and obliging U.S. veterans' spouses to "run the gauntlet of administra-
tive discretion" would read a carefully wrought remedial statute in a "deci-
mating spirit." '225 Frankfurter counseled that courts should avoid such a
parsimonious construction unless "the letter of Congress is inexorable."'226
Justice Jackson's dissent, joined by Frankfurter and Justice Hugo Black,
also argued against reading the statute to permit the "abrupt and brutal exclu-
sion of the wife of an American citizen without a hearing."'227 Jackson
declined to read the statute in this rigid fashion. Instead, Jackson would have
imposed a clear statement rule, demanding "more explicit language" from
Congress to authorize the "break up [of] the family of an American citizen
... without notice of charges ... [or] evidence of guilt."228
The attention to the statutory landscape and to past practice in the Court's
Cold War precedents and the dissents by Frankfurter and Jackson in Knauff
provide a template for curbing structural spillover through statutory interpre-
tation. The Cold War Court's decisions often assisted individuals imperiled
by arbitrary administrative action. In the administrative state, avowedly
benevolent programs can also entail an agency's disregard of statutory con-
text and past practice. The next section addresses the interpretive approach
that the Court has recently taken to curb agency efforts at regulation or lar-
gesse unmoored from legislative context.
C. Reading Regulatory Statutes in Context
Frankfurter's observation that a single statutory provision cannot be read "in
isolation" presages more cent administrative law precedents that require read-
ing a statute as a "harmonious whole."22 9 Like Frankfurter's assessment of
the statutory landscape, these more recent cases partake of "common sense
' 230
and a sense of proportion. Exercising practical judgment under this approach
curbs structural spillovers in agency arbitrariness. In delegating power to agen-
cies through statutory text, Congress does not typically "hide elephants in
224. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 549.
225. Id. at 548-49.
226. Id. at 548.
227. Id. at 550.
228. Id. at 552. Subsequent developments vindicated Frankfurter's and Jackson's positions. After
members of Congress proposed private bills that would have remedied Knauff's predicament, the attorney
general agreed to provide Knauff with the administrative hearing. A hearing officer found that the govern-
ment's charges against Knauff were the product of misinformation. Knauff became an LPR, joining her
husband in the United States. See Weisselberg, supra note 222.
229. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000); cf. John F. Manning,
The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. CT. REv. 223, 228 (2000) (expressing
skepticism about Brown as unduly intrusive in interpreting open-ended statutory provisions).
230. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 133.
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mouseholes.' '231 A court should carefully scrutinize administrative assertions
that a single provision confers sweeping power, weighing that claim against
contrary indications in the "overall statutory scheme.' 23 2 That scrutiny casts
doubt on some wide-ranging regulatory programs.233 It also indicated that
President Obama's Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) program
exceeded Congress's delegation to the Executive and makes the legality of the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program a close question.234
1. Interpretive Harmony and the Regulatory State
The Court has invoked this practical judgment to deny deference under
both steps required under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council:
23
1) whether the statute is ambiguous236 and, 2) given ambiguity, whether
agency action is reasonable. In each situation, the avoidance canon is also
part of the landscape, since broad, standardless delegations may raise consti-
tutional problems.237 However, even if broad delegations do not raise consti-
tutional concerns, the Court will still determine how a specific provision fits
into the entire statutory context, informed by past practice.
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation,238 the Court consid-
ered the overall statutory landscape in determining that the federal Food and
Drug Act unambiguously barred efforts by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to regulate tobacco products, including potentially banning them alto-
gether. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor cited signposts in the legal
landscape indicating that Congress had placed tobacco products off limits for
the FDA. Congress had repeatedly enacted legislation with knowledge of the
FDA's longstanding previous view that it lacked such regulatory power under
231. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,468 (2001).
232. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 133; see also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480,2489
(2015) (construing meaning of "exchange" under Affordable Care Act); Doerfler, supra note 180, at 561-
64 (offering cautious praise of decision in King); Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia's Unfinished Business in
Statutory Interpretation. Where Textualism's Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2053 (2017)
(same); Mila Sohoni, King's Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1425-26 (2018) (same).
233. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442-44 (2014); cf. Lisa Heinzerling,
The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1933, 1944-54 (2017) (criticizing Utility Air); Sohoni,
supra note 232 (explaining result in Utility Air).
234. See infra notes 260-77 and accompanying text.
235. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
236. Discerning whether a statute is ambiguous may itself be a complex inquiry, fraught with the
risk that a judge's subjective leanings will induce a particular outcome. See Brett M. Kavanaugh (Book
Review), 129 HARV. L. REv. 2118, 2136 (2016) (observing that "there is often no good or predictable
way for judges to determine whether statutory text contains 'enough' ambiguity to... resort to...
Chevron deference" or other interpretive devices uch as the avoidance canon).
237. See United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 667-77 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from
rehearing en banc) (suggesting that delegation problems could attend broad reading of provision of Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) that gave Attorney General to decide certain matters
regarding obligations of offenders whose convictions preceded passage of the legislation); see also Gundy v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018) (granting writ of certiorari to the Second Circuit on this question).
238. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. 120 (2000). On the application of this case to execu-
tive action regarding immigration, see Peter Margulies, Deferred Action and the Bounds of Agency
Discretion. Reconciling Policy and Legality in Immigration Enforcement, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 147-
148 (2015).
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the statute.239 Indeed, over the course of several decades after the public had
acquired knowledge of the harms caused by smoking, Congress had rejected
legislation that would have specifically authorized regulation by the FDA.24 °
Instead, Congress had declared that, "the marketing of tobacco constitutes one
of the greatest basic industries of the United States ... and stable conditions
therein are necessary to the general welfare. '241 Rather than prohibit the sale
of tobacco products, Congress had authorized the government to address the
health risks caused by tobacco through warnings in packaging and advertis-
ing.242 Justice O'Connor observed that these provisions would be futile and su-
perfluous if Congress had authorized the FDA to simply prohibit the sale of
tobacco products.2 43 In light of these statutory signals, Justice O'Connor
inferred that he agency had exerted power beyond Congress's delegation.
In addressing Chevron's second step-an inquiry into the reasonableness
of agency action-the Court has lately also assessed both statutory structure
and past practice, focusing on Justice Frankfurter's counsel that he Court not
construe a statutory provision "in isolation." In Utility Air Regulatory Group
v. EPA,2 4 the Court held that it was unreasonable for the agency to include
greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide under the definition of "any air pol-
lutant" in the Clean Air Act's permitting program for Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) in air quality. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) argued in Utility Air that the term, "any air pollutant," under
the PSD program included greenhouse gases.24 ' As support, the EPA cited
the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,246 that the agency's
overall regulatory authority extended to "any air pollution agent.'24 7 The
Massachusetts Court had defined this term to include "all airborne com-
pounds of whatever stripe," including greenhouse gases.248 On the surface,
therefore, the statutory definition appeared to include greenhouse gases.
Pushing back on EPA's sweeping definition of "any air pollutant" in
Utility Air, the Court in a 5-4 decision held that reading the phrase "any air
pollutant" under the PSD "in isolation" from the PSD's context and intended
purpose would undermine the statute.249 According to Justice Scalia, who
wrote for the Court, that context included the EPA's own candid acknowl-
edgment that placing greenhouse gases within the PSD program would expo-
nentially expand that program2 ° beyond the "large industrial sources" that
239. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 519 U.S. at 144.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 136-37.
242. Id. at 138 39.
243. Id. at 139-40.
244. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427,2444 (2014).
245. Id. at 2440.
246. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
247. Id. at 528.
248. Id. at 529.
249. Id. at 2442.
250. Id. at 2444.
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Congress had sought to curb.21 EPA's proposed expansion of the PSD to
include greenhouse gases would cover tens of thousands of ordinary "com-
mercial and residential uses," including apartment houses and epartment
stores. 252 Since EPA agreed that regulating this flood of new sources would be
impractical and counterproductive,2 3 the agency had proposed new triggers
for the PSD program "of its own choosing" that would have exempted most of
these sources.254 In essence, Justice Scalia asserted, EPA's ungainly efforts to
corral the many moving parts set in motion by its statutory theory amounted to
a "rewrite . . [of] clear portions of the statute.255 That extensive rewrite
exceeded Congress's delegation2 6 and pushed the separation-of-powers enve-
lope.257 For the Court, viewing "any air pollutant" as a phrase with varying
meanings depending on its place in the statutory scheme was more faithful to
the structure of the Clean Air Act and to the agency's past practice.25 8
2. Reading Statutes in Context: Executive Action Benefiting Immigrants
In preparing for analysis of EO-3 under a contextual view of the INA, it
is instructive to examine the judicial response to two programs of President
Obama designed to benefit immigrants: DAPA 259 and DACA. 260 Each
251. EPA Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31514, 31557 (June 3, 2010). That expansion would have
occurred because, addressing pollutants covered by the PSD program, the Clean Air Act requires permits for
sources that emit over 250 tons per year, or 100 tons for certain stationary sources uch as power plants. See
42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (setting quantitative limits); id., § 7475(a)(3)(A) (barring emissions exceeding those lim-
its). EPA conceded that Congress intended those limits to apply only to emission of harmful particulate matter
such as coal dust from large stationary sources such as electric plants and the like. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed.
Reg. 31514, 31557. To address this apparent clash with legislative intent, EPA proposed unilaterally raising
allowable limits beyond express statutory thresholds for the large number of additional sources, such as apart-
ment buildings, that its new interpretation would have covered. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2444. The Court
viewed this suggestion as an impermissible departure from limits set by Congress. Id. at 2444-46.
252. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2443.
253. For example, the agency estimated that annual permit applications for the Clean Air Act pro-
gram at issue would have jumped from 800 to 82,000 and permits for a related program also addressed by
the proposed rule change would have increased from 15,000 to approximately 6.1 million. Id. (citation
omitted). It also calculated that annual administrative costs would increase from under $100 million to
over $20 billion. Id. In addition, the agency conceded that "decade-long delays" would routinely affect
most major construction projects. Id
254. Id. at 2445.
255. Id. at 2446.
256. Id. at 2445.
257. Id. at 2446.
258. Id. at 2444-46.
259. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Leon
Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs, Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot.
(Nov. 20, 2014); see also Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion. Deferred Action,
Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1183 (2015) (analyzing DAPA's legality);
cf. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J.
104 (2015) (arguing for expansive view of presidential power to benefit immigrants); David S.
Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 Nw. U.L. REV. 583, 614-18
(2017) (suggesting that deference to Executive in immigration law will vary with context); Jason A.
Cade, Judging Immigration Equity. Deportation and Proportionality in the Supreme Court, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1029 (2017) (analyzing scope of presidential authority).
260. See Memorandum for David Aguilar, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Alejandro Mayorkas, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services., and John Morton,
196 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 33:159
program made use of deferred action, a form of discretionary administrative
relief.261 Courts rightly concluded that DAPA, which the Obama administra-
tion projected to be a much larger program, exceeded Congress's narrow dele-
gation and parted with past practice.262 DACA fits Congress's delegation,
although the analysis here illustrates why the question is a close one.
President Obama's proposed DAPA program entailed granting work au-
thorization and a renewable reprieve from removal to over four million of
the roughly 11 million undocumented noncitizens in the United States-
approximately 40% of the total. It is useful to recall here that he INA care-
fully specifies groups that are eligible to receive immigrant visas and
acquire a pathway to citizenship in the United States. In limiting these
favored groups to carefully tailored categories, Congress has repeatedly
expressed concern that higher-than-specified levels of immigration could
affect the employment prospects of U.S. citizens and LPRs.263 That con-
cern drove the 1986 Congress to enact sanctions on employers hiring undo-
cumented workers as part of a legislative bargain that also legalized over a
million undocumented immigrants.264
As a corollary to its tailored visa categories, Congress has limited the
access of people without a legal status to relief such as a reprieve from
Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland
Security, Re: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
States as Children 2 (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf (hereinafter Napolitano DACA Memo); see also
Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial Discretion,
and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. RFv. 105 (2014) (analyzing DACA).
261. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471,483 84 (1999) (noting
that "[a]t each stage [of the removal process] the Executive has discretion to abandon the endeavor.., in
a regular practice (which had come to be known as 'deferred action') of exercising that discretion for hu-
manitarian reasons or simply for its own convenience"). The Court held in AADC that Congress had pre-
cluded judicial review of decisions to deny deferred action. Id. at 487 (suggesting that Congress had
precluded such review to avoid disruptions in removal proceedings). The preclusion of judicial review for
denials of deferred action indicates that no individual has a legal entitlement to this relief or to its renewal
if the agency conferred it for a finite period.
262. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 178-82 (5th Cir. 2015), affd by an equally divided
Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); cf. Peter Margulies, Deferred Action and the Bounds of Agency
Discretion: Reconciling Policy and Legality in Immigration Enforcement, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 159
(2015) (observing that, "[h]aving balked at the relatively modest discretionary benefits provided by EVD
... Congress would surely bridle at the cornucopia of benefits provided by DAPA"); Daphna Renan,
Presidential Norms, 131 HARV. L. REv. 2187, 1258-59 (2018) (discussing DAPA in overall context of
unwritten executive branch norms); see also Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II:
Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 213 (2015) (arguing that DAPA overstepped
presidential authority).
263. H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, at 111 (1996) (finding that access to U.S. jobs was "magnet" for unlaw-
ful migration).
264. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201, 100 Stat.
3359, 3394; cf. S. Rep. No. 99-132, at 16 (1985) (describing the 1986 legalization as a .'one-time only'
program"). Seeking to reassure Congress and other stakeholders that grants of deferred action, typically
including a work permit, outside IRCA would be small in number, the Justice Department stated in 1987
that the "number of aliens authorized to accept employment [pursuant to deferred action outside IRCA] is
quite small and the impact on the labor market is minimal." See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Immigr. &
Naturalization Service, Employment Authorization; Classes of Aliens Eligible, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,092 (Dec.
4, 1987) (emphasis added). Indeed, officials claimed that the number of work authorizations was so small
that it was "previously considered to be not worth recording." Id. at 46,093 (emphasis added).
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removal and a work permit. For example, successive administrations had
granted what immigration officials called "extended voluntary departure"
(EVD) to individuals in removal proceedings who had no path available to
obtain a legal status, thus allowing those individuals to stay in the United
States indefinitely. In 1996, Congress limited EVD to 120 days.265 Congress
took this action because, as immigration officials conceded, " [t]oo often, vol-
untary departure has been sought and obtained by persons who have no real
intention to depart.'266 Congress's curtailment of EVD would be futile if the
Executive could wink at those limits with unbounded awards of deferred
267action.
While Congress did mention "deferred action" in the INA, statutory ac-
knowledgment of this practice extends only to foreign nationals with a clear
pathway to a legal status. For example, consider applicants for a U or T visa,
which Congress made available respectively to victims of crime generally
and victims of trafficking in particular.268 Immigration officials granted
deferred action to applicants for U and T visas to ensure orderly determina-
tions about eligibility for these visas; removing applicants would have dis-
rupted this process, which typically requires face-to-face interviews at local
immigration offices in the United States. Congress quickly acknowledged the
wisdom of this expedient.269 While immigration officials have granted
deferred action even when that is not a "bridge" to an available legal status,
these equitable grants have been small in number, centered on hardships such
as illness or old age.270
Virtually none of the over 4 million prospective DAPA recipients could
have used deferred action as a bridge to a legal status that would be available
within a reasonable time. For most DAPA recipients, the wait for a legal sta-
tus would be between ten and thirty years, including ten years spent abroad
because of INA provisions that hinder acquisition of legal status by persons
who have entered the United States unlawfully.271 Addressing the lack of a
bridge to legal status for most prospective recipients, the Obama
265. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A).
266. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Immigr. & Naturalization Service & Executive Office for Immigr.
Rev., Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of
Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10324 (March 6, 1997).
267. Cf. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 180 (5th Cir. 2015) (discussing basis for holding that
DAPA exceeded delegation). The Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel memorandum supporting
DAPA conceded that its impact would be substantial. See Memorandum from Karl R. Thompson,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Sec'y of Homeland Sec. and
the Counsel to the President, The Department of Homeland Security's Authority to Prioritize Removal of
Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others 31 (Nov. 19,
2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/1 1/20/2014-1 1-19-auth-
prioritize-removal.pdf (acknowledging that "the potential size of the program is large").
268. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T), (U).
269. Seeid. § 1227(d)(1).
270. SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015).
271. See OLC Memorandum, supra note 267, at 29 n. 14 (discussing statutory obstacles to DAPA
recipients' gaining legal status).
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administration claimed power to award deferred action under generic provi-
sions of the INA giving senior officials power to set rules272 or instructing
employers that they could legally hire foreign nationals who had received
work authorization. Citing proportion and common sense, the Fifth Circuit
held that the INA did not hide the "elephant" of sweeping executive discre-
tion in the "mousehole" of these generic provisions, which had to be read in
light of express restrictions on such discretion elsewhere in the statute.273
DACA's legality is a closer question. This program-like DAPA emi-
nently defensible on policy grounds-awarded eferred action to a smaller
cohort: undocumented children whose parents brought hem to the United
States. As with DAPA, one defining element of this group is the lack of any
path, such as asylum, to a legal status under the INA. Moreover, although the
number of DACA recipients is smaller than the pool of prospective DAPA
recipients would have been, its absolute numbers are still large: over 800,000
individuals currently participate.27' That said, DACA recipients can marshal
equities that distinguish them from individuals who would have received
benefits under DAPA. DACA recipients had no voice in their parents' deci-
sion to enter the country. In addition, DAPA recipients have forged close
social and cultural ties to the United States27 and often have no ongoing rela-
tionship to their countries of origin. Deferred action under DACA thus more
closely resembles equitable relief from a range of hardships, including seri-
ous illness, disability, and extreme youth or old age, that has long been a fea-
ture of the immigration system.
276
272. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (2012) (authorizing officials to "establish such regulations; prescribe
such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other papers; issue such instructions; and perform such other acts
as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this [Act]") (emphasis
added).
273. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 180-81 (5th Cir. 2015).
274. See NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, at 461 (D.D.C. Aug. 3,2018).
275. See Napolitano DACA Memo, supra note 260, at 2 (noting that many DACA recipients have
"already contributed to our country in significant ways").
276. See Wadhia, supra note 270; but see Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On. The
Obama Administration's Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care
Clause, 91 TEx. L. REv. 781 (2013) (asserting that DACA exceeded presidential authority). Recently,
courts have addressed whether the Trump administration has made findings that are legally sufficient to
support its decision to end the DACA program. In the absence of congressional action codifying some
version of DACA, the legal challenges to DACA's rescission will be dispositive. In June, 2018, the
Department of Homeland Security issued a memorandum that sought for the second time to explain its de-
cision to rescind DACA. See Memorandum from Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen (June 22, 2018), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18 0622 S1 Memorandum DACA.pdf (hereinafter Nielsen
Memorandum). That memorandum relied on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d
134 (2015), determining that DAPA did not fit the INA's "comprehensive scheme." Nielsen Memorandum,
at 2. Since DACA is similar to DAPA in a number of material respects, Secretary Nielsen indicated that the
invalidation of DAPA also raised "serious doubts about [DACA's] legality." Secretary Nielsen asserted that
those doubts constituted a sufficient basis for ending the program. Despite the discretionary nature of
deferred action, a more detailed explanation would have put the rescission on firmer legal footing. See
NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2018). Determining that the June memorandum
did not require a change in the court's prior conclusion that the DACA rescission was arbitrary and
capricious, the NAACP court faulted Secretary Nielsen for relying too heavily on the Fifth Circuit's
decision invalidating DAPA and for failing to address how DACA was inconsistent with the INA's scheme.
Id. at 472. DACA's differences from DAPA warrant a different judgment about its legality. Admittedly, as
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V. THE HAwAII COURT'S MISSED OPPORTUNITY: WHY EO-3 FAILS TO FIT THE
INA
In light of the Court's two strands of precedent-the first on avoidance and
tempering executive branch excess and the second on contextual reading of
statutes in administrative law-the Hawaii Court had a clear path available
to hold that EO-3 exceeded the scope of Congress's delegation under the
INA. Signposts on that path would have prominently featured statutory struc-
ture, context, and past practice. While the Hawaii majority's statutory read-
ing purported to address these points, its analysis fell into the trap that the
Court's precedents have flagged: reading a single provision in isolation-
here the entry provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), relied on by President Trump.
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion for the Court gave a rigid account of the INA
comprehensive scheme, far from the contextual approach that Justice Scalia
had employed for the Clean Air Act in Utility Air. In addition, Chief Justice
Roberts' account of past practice was stilted and mechanical. The majority's
flawed approach to the statutory issue only served to underline the severe ten-
sions in its Establishment Clause analysis.
A. How EO-3 Undermines the INA' s Priority on Family Reunification
The central problem with EO-3 is reconciling how 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) fits
within the "overall statutory scheme." The Supreme Court's precedents state
unequivocally that a single provision such as § 1182(f) cannot be read in "iso-
lation." Instead, courts should read that provision in the "context" of the stat-
ute "as a whole. '277 As Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged in his opinion
for the Court in King v. Burwell,27 8 that interpretive task is not mechanical; it
requires an effort to understand "context. "279
Understanding the context of § 1182(f) centers on reconciling the admit-
tedly broad language of this 1952 addition to the INA with Congress's full-
scale rethinking of the INA in 1965.280 In 1965, Congress modified the INA
in two essential respects. First, i  made family reunification the "foremost"
with DAPA, DACA promulgated "public policies of non-enforcement ... for broad classes and catego-
ries" of otherwise removable foreign nationals. Nielsen Memorandum, at 2. However, the Nielsen memo-
randum did not adequately address arguments for DACA's legality, including its parallels with earlier
exercises of prosecutorial discretion for hardships such as youth, age, or disability. A fuller explanation
would also have helped deflect arguments that DACA's rescission violated equal protection, in light of
the prevalence of Mexican nationals and Central Americans among DACA recipients and President
Trump's negative comments about these groups. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 518-20 (9th Cir. 2018). Moreover, the substantial disruption threatened by
the proposed DACA rescission also justified awarding preliminary relief pending a fuller explanation of
DHS's legal concerns. See id. at 520-21 (Owens, J., concurring). Finally, on a policy level, the plight of
DACA recipients is compelling. Those compelling equities buttress the case for prompt congressional
action to codify DACA.
277. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
278. Kingv. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
279. Id. at 2489 (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 133).
280. See Chin, supra note 28.
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priority in granting immigrant visas.281 Second, Congress did away with the
most serious statutory obstacle to family reunification: the national origin
quota system. This system hindered family reunification for decades by sub-
jecting particular countries and regions to rigid numerical limits.282 To rein-
force its decisive rejection of national origin quotas, Congress enacted the
INA's antidiscrimination provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), which barred
discrimination on the basis of national origin in the issuance of immigrant
visas.
Under the INA's scheme, trained U.S. State Department consular officials
decide visa applications based on a complex, often iterative process.283 For
consular officers, managing uncertainty is paramount. Consular officials
determine in hundreds of thousands of cases each year whether an applicant
is eligible for a visa-for example, as a spouse, parent, or child of a U.S.
citizen-and whether the applicant is inadmissible for one of a host of rea-
sons specified in the INA, such as being a member of a terrorist group,284 hav-
ing a criminal record or serious communicable disease, or lacking a source of
financial support in the United States.285 When consular officials do not
receive information from the applicant that enables them to determine eligi-
bility and admissibility, they can either request further evidence or simply
deny the visa application.286 That iterative approach to resolving uncertainty
is endemic to consular decision-making, as Congress surely understood at the
time of the 1965 amendments.287
Recent legislation concerning the visa waiver program illustrates
Congress's faith in consular officials' ability to handle uncertainty. The visa
waiver program allows nationals of certain countries to travel to the United
States as nonimmigrants if those countries meet certain security require-
ments.288 Congress in 2015 provided that nationals of countries participating
in the visa waiver program would have to go through the ordinary consular
process if they had spent time in a "country or area of concern" including
Iraq or Syria.289 In other words, faced with the risk that individuals who had
spent time in areas riven by armed conflict and had acquired terrorist ties
could enter the United States under the visa waiver program, Congress
281. U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st sess., Report No. 748 accompanying
H.R. 2580, at 13 (Sept. 15, 1965) (hereinafter 1965 Senate Judiciary Committee Report)
282. Id. at 14 (noting that for several decades, the INA had either absolutely prohibited the immigra-
tion and naturalization of Asians or authorized annual grant of 2,000 visas to this group).
283. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140-41 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
284. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182)(a)(3)(B).
285. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2140-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
286. Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1155-56 (D.C. Cir. 1999). To allow the consular of-
ficer free rein in this process, judicial review of visa denials is generally unavailable. Id. at 1156-57; see
generally Leon Wildes, Review of Visa Denials: The American Consul as 20th Century Absolute
Monarch, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 887, 895-97 (1989).
287. See Wildes, supra note 287, at 895-97 (tracing the doctrine of consular nonreviewability to case
law from the 1920s, including Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929)).
288. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(1), (2).
289. Id.at§ 1187(a)(12).
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imposed a time-honored cure: proceeding through the rigors of consular
processing.
Putting together these elements into an "overall scheme" suggests limits
on § 1182(f), which authorizes the President to deny entry to "any" foreign
national or group of foreign nationals whose admission could be detrimental
to the interests of the United States. Read in isolation, that language might
seem to authorize the draconian restrictions of EO-3, which indefinitely
barred applicants for immigrant visas from several countries, subject to an
onerous and opaque waiver process.29 However, as the Cold War precedents
counsel and the Court recently cautioned in Utility Air, courts should not read
statutory provisions in isolation.291 In using the word, "any," Congress may
have something more tailored in mind. Meaning that initially appears plain
may seem more nuanced once the court considers the overall context of the
statute. 292
In addressing the contours of the authority conferred by § 1182(f), the
overall scheme of the INA post-1965 might suggest that the President
had limited power to exclude persons for particular conduct that clashed with
U.S. foreign or immigration policy. That power would be interstitial, supple-
menting the ordinary visa application process, but not supplanting it for a pe-
riod of indefinite duration. Without this constraint in place, the Executive
could invoke § 1182(f) to undermine the INA's prioritizing of family reunifi-
cation and its rejection of national origin quotas. Such a result would be
inconsistent with Congress's comprehensive scheme.
B. The Majority's Misuse of Precedent
Beyond an isolated look at § 1182(f), the Hawaii majority's support for its
statutory holding is thin. For example, Chief Justice Roberts cited language
from Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,293 in which the Court rejected a
constitutional challenge to a federal statute that barred material support of
terrorist organizations. Finding that the First Amendment did not prohibit
Congress from prohibiting speech performed in "coordination with" State-
Department-designated foreign terrorist organizations such as Hamas or Al
Qaeda, the Humanitarian Law Project Court invoked the "considered judg-
ment of Congress and the Executive" and the deference due to such joint
determinations by the political branches.294 The language in Humanitarian
Law Project that Chief Justice Roberts quoted about a "preventive mea-
sure"295 and the leeway afforded "empirical conclusions" referred to a statute
enacted by Congress and the findings that Congress made as part of the
290. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2432-33 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
291. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427,2440-44 (2014).
292. Id.
293. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (cited in Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2409).
294. Id. at 36.
295. Id. at 35 (cited in Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2409).
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legislative process. While Humanitarian Law Project surely is an example of
judicial deference, its discussion of the flexibility afforded by the
Constitution to Congress in foreign affairs did not address Hawaii's statutory
question about the scope of Congress's delegation to the President under the
INA.
The majority's reliance on Sale v. Haitian Centers Council2 96 is similarly
misplaced. Chief Justice Roberts cited Sale to counter an argument that EO-
3's challengers never made: that courts should engage in a "searching in-
quiry" regarding whether EO-3 was "justified from a policy perspective. " '297
However, the challenge to EO-3 was never about policy per se. It was about
EO-3's fit with the INA and the Establishment Clause. While EO-3's chal-
lengers did argue that EO-3 failed even a rudimentary test of means-ends
rationality, that argument largely served to highlight EO-3's lack of fit with
either source of legal authority.
Moreover, the passage from Sale that Chief Justice Roberts quoted has
only modest relevance to the issue in Hawaii. In Sale, the Court, in an opinion
by Justice Stevens, held that the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980 did not apply
extraterritorially, upholding a longstanding presidential policy of interdicting
migrants in the Caribbean who often asserted they were refugees and sought
to enter the United States without visas.2 98 That holding had implications for
the Refugee Act's protections, such as an individual's right to an interview
about his or her fear of persecution in her home country and an appearance
before a U.S. immigration judge. According to the Court, those protections
did not apply to migrants on the high seas who lacked U.S. visas and had
failed to avail themselves of statutory processes for seeking refugee status at
U.S. consulates abroad.299 Since the Court's familiar presumption against
exterritorial application of U.S. statutes obviated the duty to make such safe-
guards available, the President was free to use his "chosen method" of inter-
dicting inadmissible migrants on the high seas, even if that method imposed a
"greater risk of harm" on the individuals that the United States intercepted.00
The leeway that the President possessed in Sale stemmed from the Court's
application of its presumption against exterritorial application of statutes.0 1
Sale thus has only limited relevance to the group harmed by EO-3. This
group is comprised of otherwise eligible and admissible visa pplicants and
their U.S. citizen and LPR sponsors, who have all meticulously followed
rules for visa processing. The majority in Hawaii acknowledged that the
296. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 187-88 (1993) (cited in Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at
2409).
297. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2409.
298. Sale, 509 U.S. at 187-88.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 188; see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro., 569 U.S. 108 (2012); RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). Admittedly,
Justice Stevens noted that presidential responsibility over foreign affairs gave the presumption of extrater-
ritoriality "special force." Sale, 509 U.S. at 188.
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INA's antidiscrimination provision covered these visa applicants.30 2
However, the Hawaii majority then narrowly interpreted the antidiscrimina-
tion provision in a way that clashed with the INA's overall scheme and did
not gain support from the Court's more modest holding in Sale.
It is true that the Court has often inferred a broader scope of delegation in
matters concerning national security and foreign affairs.30 3 However, that
deference has not been absolute, as the curbs on presidential power in Ex
Parte Endo3 4 and Kent v. Dulles.. demonstrate. Moreover, there is good
reason to view the INA as cabining delegation to the President. The statutory
schemes that prompted an inference of broader delegation did not include
countervailing provisions, such as the INA's nondiscrimination provision, or
priorities, such as Congress's elevation in 1965 of family unification as a
"foremost" concern. In addition, in Medellin v. Texas,30 6 a case concerning a
treaty obligation of the United States, the Court held that the President lacked
the power to order states to comply with the treaty's terms.30 7 That decision
also encompassed the differences between statutes and treaties, the role of
the federal courts in enforcing certain treaty terms, and the relationship
between the federal government and the states.30 8 Nevertheless, the willing-
ness of the Court to recognize that such interests tempered executive power
in Medellin contrasts with the mechanical deference accorded EO-3.
C. Hawaii's Truncated Analysis of Past Practice
EO-3 also does not comport with past practice under § 1182(f). In cases
like Kent v. Dulles,30 9 the Court treated past practice as instructive regarding
the nature of the statutory scheme at issue.310 The Hawaii majority consid-
ered this dimension, although it was more grudging in its acknowledgment of
past practice's role311 and failed to recognize that past uses of § 1182(f) have
been far more tailored and targeted.
302. Hawaii, 138S. Ct. at 2413.
303. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (arguing that in foreign
affairs the President has an advantage over Congress and the judiciary in acquiring, analyzing, and pro-
tecting information); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (upholding presidential action to limit travel to
Cuba); see also JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR
(2006) (urging expansive view of presidential authority); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 206, at 2102
(suggesting approval of result in Wald); but see KOH, NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION, supra note
206, at 140-41 (criticizing Court's decision in Wald as conflicting with statutory scheme).
304. Exparte Mitsuyo Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 294 (1944).
305. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
306. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
307. Id. at 523-24.
308. Cf. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088-89 (2014) (narrowing interpretation of
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 to avoid trenching on state authority over or-
dinary criminal justice matters).
309. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
310. Id. at 122-23; see also supra notes 205-210 (discussing Court's rationale in Kent).
311. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2413 (2018) (discussing past practice as contingent aid
to interpretation, predicated on needless urge to "confine expansive language [of § 1182(f)] in light of its
past applications").
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In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts first compared EO-3
favorably with past practice, asserting that its recommendations were "more
detailed. '312 The majority's lauding of EO-3's "detailed" language is flawed
in two respects. First, as noted in our discussion of the disconnect between
the Court's minimal constitutional scrutiny and the Cleburne line of equal
protection cases the majority cited as authoritative,313 EO-3's vaunted detail
masked its woeful absence of means-ends fit. No amount of detail can justify
or explain excluding infants because of national security concerns or permit-
ting consular officers to vet students but not close relatives of U.S. citizens or
LPRs. Viewed in this light, EO-3's "detail[]" resembles a diligently drawn
map of Tolkien's Middle Earth3 4-intriguing for aficionados but of little
practical use in the worlds of policy and law.315
Second, the Hawaii majority's stress on the superiority of EO-3's detail to
past practice under § 1182(f) masks the careful tailoring of those earlier
examples. Precisely because most past examples reflected careful tailoring at
their inception, they did not need the surface detail that the majority in
Hawaii found so compelling. Consider President Clinton's 1996 suspension
of entry for "members of the Sudanese government and armed forces. "316
Chief Justice Roberts derided this measure's brevity, noting that the restric-
tion took only "one sentence" to articulate.3 7 However, as Chief Justice
Roberts noted elsewhere in his opinion,318 President Clinton's order incorpo-
rated by reference an entire United Nations Security Council Resolution,1 9
which imposed restrictions on Sudanese government personnel because of
Sudan's failure to extradite individuals accused of attempting to assassinate
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak at the behest of a terrorist group.
320
Moreover, President Clinton's order did not restrict the entry of all nationals
312. Id. at 2409.
313. See supra notes 122-153 and accompanying text.
314. Maps of Tolkien's world are common. See LOTR Project, Map of Middle Earth (last visited
[the map, not the place] Aug. 13, 2018), http://lotrproject.com/map/#zoom=3&lat=-1315.5&lon=1500&
layers=BTTTTT.
315. It is possible that Chief Justice Roberts' main concern in the discussion of EO-3's "detail[]"
was on the plaintiffs' claim that the INA requires specific and express findings for every presidential invo-
cation of § 1182(f). Some judges below made this assertion. See International Refugee Assistance Project
(IRAP) v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 316 (4th Cir. 2018) (Keenan, J., concurring). A requirement of specific
and express findings for every use of this statutory power would be burdensome, particularly in light of
that provision's broad language. See also Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1049 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(R. Ginsburg, J.) (describing language as "sweeping"). However, the Hawaii majority also criticized the
plaintiffs' assertion that an order of EO-3's unprecedented scope should demonstrate rudimentary means-
ends fit. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2409 (criticizing challengers' claim that EO-3 is underinclusive because it
permits nonimmigrants from listed countries to enter the United States). This Article argues that a show-
ing of means-ends fit is required both by the INA's comprehensive scheme and antidiscrimination provi-
sion and by the Cleburne line of cases that the Hawaii majority cited in its Establishment Clause analysis.
See supra notes 277-291 and accompanying text.
316. Presidential Proclamation No. 6958, 3 CFR 133 (1996).
317. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2409.
318. Id. at 2413.
319. See U.N. SCR 1054 (26 Apr 1996), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1054.
320. Id. at para. 3, (cited in Pres. Proclamation 13662); see also Youssef M. Ibrahim, Egyptian
Groups Says It Tried to Kill Mubarak, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1995, at A3.
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of Sudan,321 but only entry of those Sudanese officials likely to enter the
United States in their official capacity-the very group singled out by the
Security Council. President Clinton's restriction thus tracked international
efforts to address Sudan's harboring of President Mubarak's would-be assas-
sins. The "one sentence" in this order that Chief Justice Roberts disparaged
was all that President Clinton needed to indicate the United States' effort to
comply with the Security Council's terrorism-related resolution.
Viewed more broadly, executive practice markedly diverges from the
sweeping multi-country ban on immigration in EO-3. Most uses of § 1182(f)
wield authority in a tailored fashion that targets small, discrete groups of for-
eign nationals.32 2 For example, President Ronald Reagan barred associates of
the then Panamanian strong-man, Manuel Noriega.323 More recently,
President Obama-in an example cited by Chief Justice Roberts3 24-barred
entry of Russians in the financial, energy, mining, engineering, or defense
sectors." 3 2 The selection of covered occupations was not random; it covered
persons most likely to be involved in the action that the President responded
to: the Russian annexation of Crimea and illegal use of force in Ukraine.326
President Obama did not target all Russians, let alone Russians plus all indi-
viduals from other countries. In this sense, President Obama's action had a
nexus to combating internationally lawless action that is wholly lacking in
EO-3.
The three previous exercises of § 1182(f) authority involving larger groups
were more carefully tailored than President Trump's travel ban. Two of these
examples-involving an immigration dispute with Cuba3 27 and high-seas
interdiction,3 28 respectively-entailed attempts to control "mass migration"
of inadmissible foreign nationals to the United States. The third was part of
the U.S. response to Iran's detention of U.S. diplomatic personnel in bla-
tant violation of international law3 29 -a crisis in which the Supreme Court
in 1981 upheld broad use of executive authority.330 Moreover, these orders
either did not cover immigrant visa applicants at all-as with high-seas
interdiction-or else included exceptions for many visa applicants that far
exceeded the narrowly drafted waiver provisions in EO-3.
321. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2413 (conceding that President Clinton's order was "directed at sub-
sets of aliens from the countries at issue").
322. See Kate M. Manuel, Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens: In Brief, Cong. Res'ch Serv., at 3-
12 (Jan. 23, 2017) (recounting past practice regarding § 1182(f)).
323. Id. at 10.
324. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2413.
325. Presidential Proclamation No. 13662,3 CFR 233 (March 20, 2014).
326. Id. Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged in his opinion for the Court in Hawaii. 138 S. Ct. at
2413.
327. Presidential Proclamation No. 5517 (1986).
328. Presidential Proclamation No. 4865 (1981) (upheld in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S.
155, 187-88 (1993)).
329. Pres. Carter, Sanctions Against Iran Remarks Announcing U.S. Actions (Apr. 7, 1980).
330. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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The Cuba mass migration example stemmed from the Castro regime's
1980 authorization of the Mariel boatlift, in which 125,000 inadmissible
Cuban nationals took to the sea and "arrived... in Florida aboard a flotilla of
small boats."'331 None of the "Marielitos" had visas for travel to the United
States. Moreover, according to the Fourth Circuit, Cuban authorities had
"taken advantage" of the boatlift to "give criminals the option to remain in
prison or to leave for the United States.332 Immigration officials in the
United States found that approximately 25,000 of the inadmissible migrants
had criminal records and detained 2,000 when they sought to enter the coun-
try.333 In December, 1984, Cuba and the United States reached an agreement
providing that Cuba would accept the return of over 2,500 of the Marielitos
with criminal histories in exchange for a U.S. undertaking to streamline legal
immigration from Cuba.334 Cuba suspended its compliance in May, 1985,33s
and the U.S. almost immediately started walking back compliance with its
undertakings, limiting visa approvals from the U.S. interests section in
Havana. Cuban authorities tried to evade these restrictions by selling Cuban
nationals exit permits at extortionate prices to facilitate applications at U.S.
consulates in other countries.336 In 1986 President Reagan responded by issu-
ing an order restricting visa approvals for Cuban nationals from any U.S. dip-
lomatic station abroad, with the important exception of immediate relatives
of U.S. citizens.337
Although the majority opinion in Hawaii discounted the differences
between EO-3 and President Reagan's Cuba measure,338 the contrast seems
stark between an order that categorically bars immigration from several
countries and President Reagan's order, which responded to systematic
Cuban efforts to facilitate "illicit migration ' 339 to the United States. EO-3,
sporting all the "detail[]" hailed by the Hawaii majority, did not claim that a
country covered by the travel ban had aided and abetted unlawful migration
to this country. Moreover, Reagan's action had a vital safety valve, since it
expressly exempted all immigration of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.
EO-3 lacks any such tailoring.
Similarly, Carter's measures regarding Iranian immigration during the
hostage crisis came in response to Iran's flagrant violation of the principle of
diplomatic immunity-a core tenet of international law recognized by the
331. See Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 101 (4th Cir. 1982) (cited in Clark v. Suarez Martinez,
543 U.S. 371, 374 (2005)).
332. Palma, 676F.2d at 101.
333. Id.
334. Gisbert v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1439 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1993).
335. Id.
336. See Gerald M. Boyd, Reagan Acts to Tighten Trade Embargo of Cuba, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 23,
1986, § 1, at 3 (reporting that Reagan administration officials asserted that Cuban authorities sought fees
up to $30,000 for exit permits).
337. See Proclamation No. 5,517, § 2.
338. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2413 (2018) (viewing distinction as too "refined" to be
material).
339. See Proclamation No. 5,517 (Preamble).
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Framers.340 The threat to U.S. diplomatic personnel during the hostage crisis
was orders of magnitude more severe than whatever attenuated harm might
conceivably flow from the illusory or de minimis recalcitrance that EO-3's
ersatz detail purported to diagnose. Moreover, Carter's measure contained a
carve-out for close relatives of persons in the United States.341 Again, EO-3's
absence of tailoring offers a glaring contrast.
D. EO-3 as a De Facto National Origin Quota
If the Hawaii majority's perfunctory look at past practice lacks precision, its
painfully narrow reading of the INA's nondiscrimination provision, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1152(a)(1)(A), distorts Congress's overall plan. Chief Justice Roberts
refused to acknowledge the remedial intent of the 1965 immigration amend-
ments. In 1965, Congress decisively rejected the national origin quotas that
had dominated U.S. immigration law for decades-quotas roundly denounced
by presidents of both parties, including Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower,
John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson.342 In enacting the INA's nondiscrimina-
tion provision, which bars national-origin discrimination in the issuance of
immigrant visas, Congress ought to prevent administrative backsliding to-
ward the discredited quota regime. Chief Justice Roberts' anodyne account of
EO-3 as a neutral product of interagency review overlooked its targeting of
nationals from particular countries that largely share one material attribute: a
Muslim-majority population. The INA's antidiscrimination mandate makes
such crude distinctions the province of Congress, not the executive.
The majority opinion relied on a formalistic distinction between § 1182(f)'s
grant of presidential authority over "entry" of foreign nationals to the United
States and § 1152(a)(1)(A)'s prohibition on discrimination in issuance of
immigrant visas.343 According to the majority, there was no clash between
President Trump's broad reading of § 1182(f) and the INA's nondiscrimina-
tion provision; the two provisions simply occupy "different spheres."'34 4 For
the majority, visa issuance merely addresses threshold eligibility for a visa,
340. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,720 (2004).
341. See U.S. Immigration Policy Regarding Iranian Nationals, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees, and Int'l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., at 28 (1980) (testi-
mony of Dep. Ass't Sec'y of State Elizabeth Harper).
342. See, e.g., 98 Cong. Rec. 8021, 8083 (1952) (including President Truman's message on his
veto which Congress overrode-of the quota-ridden 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, in which Truman cau-
tioned that "the present quota system.., discriminates, deliberately and intentionally, against many of the
peoples of the world"); Cong. Research Serv., U.S. Immigration Law and Policy: 1952-1979, at 115
(1979) (quoting Message from the President Relative to Immigration Matters, H.R. Doc. No. 85-85, at 1
(1957)) (alerting Congress that the quota system "operate[d] inequitably"); Pres. John F. Kennedy, Letter
to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House on Revision of the Immigration Laws (July
23, 1963) (advising Congress that he "national-origin quota system was "an anachronism ... [that] dis-
criminates among applicants for admission into the United States on the basis of accident of birth"); Pres.
Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1964) (declaring
that "a nation that was built by the immigrants of all lands can ask those who now seek admission: 'What
can you do for our country?' But we should not be asking: 'In what country were you born?"').
343. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2414 (2018).
344. Id.
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including ascertaining that a visa applicant is a close relative of his or her
sponsor or fits within other visa criteria. Under this view, admissibility con-
cems a wholly separate inquiry: whether the applicant has committed a crime,
engaged in terrorism, suffers from a communicable disease such as tuberculo-
sis or in any other way runs afoul of express conditions in the INA.345
This analysis arbitrarily bifurcates eligibility and admissibility determina-
tions. Consular officials routinely make both determinations before they issue
a visa.346 Indeed, a consular official's denial of a visa based on national secu-
rity inadmissibility grounds was the subject of Kerry v. Din,347 a 2015 deci-
sion that the majority cited approvingly.348 Immigration officials at U.S. ports
of entry can bar admission of newly arriving foreign nationals if those offi-
cials determine that the noncitizen has committed a crime or is otherwise
inadmissible.349 However, primary responsibility for both eligibility and
admissibility decisions resides with consular officials. The majority's mecha-
nistic distinction ignores this ground truth of immigration practice.3
Even more to the point, the majority failed to grasp how Congress's land-
mark 1965 overhaul of the INA fits with § 1182(f), which Congress enacted
in 1952. As noted, above, the 1965 amendments marked a decisive pivot
from the national origin quotas that had hamstrung the INA for decades.
Congress passed the nondiscrimination provision, § 1 152(a)(1)(A), to prevent
administrative backsliding to that discredited era. Under traditional canons of
statutory interpretation, the later, more specific provision should modify the
earlier section. 1 Without a more robust reading of the nondiscrimination
provision than the Hawaii majority could muster, the Executive could use
§ 1182(f) to recreate the national origin quotas that Congress had rejected in
1965. EO-3 is a de facto national origin quota in exactly that sense.
345. Id.
346. See supra notes 126-148 and accompanying text.
347. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140-41 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
348. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419.
349. Id. at 2414.
350. The majority noted that the INA sometimes treats visa issuance and admissibility as distinct
events. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2414 n. 3. While that is true, it has little relevance for reading the INA's non-
discrimination provision. Instead, the INA's distinctions between visa issuance and admissibility are im-
portant to the statutory scheme because admissibility often plays a role when a foreign national has
already entered the United States. For example, a foreign national in the United States who seeks to
"adjust" his or her status to lawful permanent residence will first have to demonstrate admissibility. See 8
U.S.C. § 1255(a); see also Jill E. Family, Murky Immigration Law and the Challenges Facing
Immigration Removal and Benefits Adjudication, 31 J. Nat'l Ass'n L. Jud. 45, 60 n. 65 (2011) (noting that
"to... adjust status, the foreign national must be admissible into the United States"). Of course, one could
argue that EO-3's terms may also play a role in such determinations, since EO-3 suspends "entry" of
nationals of certain countries into the United States, and for many purposes under the INA "entry" and
"admission" are interchangeable. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2414 n. 4. The larger problem of statutory inter-
pretation remains the one identified in the text: such a sweeping view of § 1182(f) would allow the
President to systematically discriminate between countries in a fashion that Congress sought to prevent in
1965.
351. See International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 304 (4th Cir.
2018) (Gregory, J., concurring) (citing, inter alia, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,
566 U.S. 639, 648 (2012)).
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By declining to give the INA's nondiscrimination provision a robust read-
ing in keeping with Congress's intent in 1965, the Hawaii majority failed to
heed Justice Frankfurter's warning in United States v. Witkovich5 2 regarding
the risks of reading a statutory provision "in isolation" from the rest of
Congress's handiwork.35 3 That inattention was all the more salient in light of
the serious methodological flaws with the majority's Establishment Clause
analysis, particularly its dilution of the means-ends scrutiny in the Cleburne
line of cases.354 A statutory holding that EO-3 exceeded Congress's delega-
tion to the President would have enabled the Court to avoid exposing these
flaws to public view. In this sense, both Ex Parte Endo35 5 and the Court's
Cold War case law356 pointed to a superior path for pushing back against
Executive excess. The Hawaii majority's failure to follow that path repre-
sents a retreat from the Court's best interpretive traditions.
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court makes a decision, it also makes a prediction,
express or implied, about the effects of that decision. That is true for a unani-
mous decision on a technical point of law. Focus on consequences is even
more salient with a 5-4 decision, such as Trump v. Hawaii, on a conspicuous
government policy. In such a decision, just as with the Japanese-American
internment or Cold War cases, the Court makes methodological choices as
well as substantive ones. The Court's methodological choices in Trump v.
Hawaii rank among its worst in decades.
The Hawaii majority was clearly cognizant of the importance of these
methodological choices and of the risk of structural spillover. Those concerns
drove Chief Justice Roberts' reminder to the dissent that parsing the meaning
of presidential statements is not merely about the White House's current
occupant, but also about "the Presidency" itself. The same concerns animated
Justice Kennedy's valedictory concurrence, with its recognition-so reminis-
cent of Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Dennis-that public officials and
the people themselves are often the last line of defense for constitutional
values.
That is where the resemblance to Justice Frankfurter stops. Frankfurter's
commitment to judicial craft encompassed not only the Hamlet-like musings
of his Dennis concurrence and his vote for the majority in Korematsu, but
also participation in cases that pushed back against government excess such
as Endo, Witkovich, and Kent. Frankfurter recognized that managing struc-
tural spillover entails not only preserving the prerogatives of the political
branches, but also the reputation of the Court.
352. United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957).
353. Id. at 199.
354. See supra notes 122-153 and accompanying text.
355. Exparte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283,294 (1944).
356. See Frickey, supra note 9.
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In contrast, the Hawaii majority's methodological approach to the
Establishment Clause analysis of EO-3 demonstrated no comparable aware-
ness of the judiciary's need for reasoned elaboration of its decisions. The
Establishment Clause issue also highlighted a failure of judicial craft from
Justice Sotomayor, whose parsing of President Trump's statement that EO-2
"watered down" EO-i ignored longtime Supreme Court constructions of that
phrase, as well as her own usage. That failure highlighted the majority's apt
anxiety that construing presidential statements is a "delicate" enterprise.
However, the methodological flaw in the majority's approach to the
Establishment Clause issue was far more serious.
In relying on the Cleburne line of cases, the Hawaii majority wanted to
have it both ways. Those cases apply a robust brand of means-ends scrutiny,
as in Cleburne's own cavil that the defendant town's special permit ordinance
for group homes did not apply to other uses with similar impacts, such as dor-
mitories and hospitals. The Hawaii majority wished to advertise its allegiance
to these "rational basis with bite" cases, without actually committing itself to
their robust methodology. As Justice Sotomayor' s dissent pointed out, even a
passing nod to serious investigation of EO-3's operation would have led to
the recognition that the young children among those excluded by EO-3 do
not pose a national security threat. Justice Frankfurter, who along with
Justice Jackson dissented from the Court's denial of relief to an immigrant
war bride in Knauff, would surely have partaken of this insight. However, the
Hawaii majority seemed more concerned with the appearance of review than
its substance, just as the "detailed" text of EO-3 that Chief Justice Roberts
touted in his majority opinion had no more real-world impact than the exquis-
ite precision one might find in an online map of Harry Potter's Hogwarts.
The right methodological call, given the Establishment Clause's poor serv-
ice as a vehicle for either supporting or striking down EO-3, would have been
to find that EO-3 exceeded the scope of delegation under the INA. Justice
Frankfurter joined in this statutory solution in Endo and many of the Court's
Cold War cases after the nadir represented by Dennis. As the Court had done
on the question of the Food and Drug Administration's statutory authority to
regulate tobacco in Brown & Williamson, the Court could have found that
EO-3's sweeping restrictions on immigrant visas were foreign to the compre-
hensive scheme of the INA and inimical to the sea change that Congress
wrought in 1965, when it rejected national origin quotas and enacted a non-
discrimination provision to preclude administrative backsliding to that dis-
credited regime. Instead, the Hawaii majority relinquished this opportunity,
relying on a mechanical distinction between visa issuance and admission that
ignored the import of Congress's 1965 reforms.
In fairness, the dissenters were little help on this score: Justice Sotomayor,
in a puzzling turn of phrase, pronounced the statutory issue too "complex."
Handling complexity is surely part of the Justices' job description. Justice
Breyer also declined to fully engage on the statutory point, although Justice
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Breyer's focus on the illusory and opaque nature of EO-3's waiver provisions
did provide a valuable blueprint for future litigation beyond the preliminary
injunction that the Court vacated.
In great cases such as Trump v. Hawaii, it is tempting to overlook method
to obtain the right result. With its concern for "the Presidency," the Hawaii
majority acknowledged the need to resist that temptation. However, the
majority's deferential posture unduly discounted deference's own cost to the
courts' institutional standing. In so doing, the majority failed to heed Justice
Jackson's warning in Korematsu that a decision that grants the political
branches too much leeway can linger like a "loaded weapon." A statutory de-
cision against EO-3 would have defused that weapon. The Hawaii majority
should have embraced that opportunity, instead of relying on a mechanical
approach that read one provision in isolation from the statute's context.

